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PRIVACY AND FUNERAL PROTESTS*
CHRISTINA E. WELLS**

This Article examines the free speech implications of funeral
protest statutes. Enacted in response to the Westboro Baptist
Church, whose members protest at funerals to spread their antigay message, such statutes restrict a broad array of peaceful
expressive activity. This Article focuses on the states' interest
underlying these statutes-protecting mourners' right to be free
from unwanted intrusions while at funeral services. Few would
argue against protectingfuneral services from intrusive protests.
These statutes, however, go far beyond that notion and protect
mourners from offensive, rather than intrusive, protests. As
such, they do not conceive of privacy as protection from
intrusion. Rather, they conceive of privacy as protecting human
dignity from breaches of civility. American law does not
traditionally recognize this conception of privacy. How then do
such statutes come to rely on it? To some extent, the fault lies
with the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence, which has
been somewhat unclear regarding the nature of the privacy
interest it weighs against free speech rights. Although a careful
read of the Court's cases shows that it rejects an interpretationof
privacy as protecting against breaches of civility, its
jurisprudence sends mixed signals. Lower courts hearing
challenges to funeral protest statutes have misread the Court's
jurisprudence and have recognized a privacy right to be free
from offensive messages while attending funerals. If allowed to
stand, these decisions will work a dramatic change in the Court's
doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION

Few things upset us quite like the desecration of a cemetery. As
one observer noted, "the human heart has rebelled against the
invasion of the cemetery precincts [and] contemplated the grave as
the last and enduring resting place after the struggles and sorrows of
this world."' Indeed, the belief that "the resting-place of the dead [is]
hallowed ground"2 has resulted in significant legal protection of
1. Ritter v. Couch, 76 S.E. 428, 930 (W.Va. 1912).
2. Brown v. Lutheran Church, 23 Pa. 495, 500 (1854).
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cemeteries 3 and their elevation as a "cultural institution."4 Funeral
rites are similarly revered as a sign of "respect a society shows for the
deceased and for the surviving family members."5 Decency, most of
us agree, requires respect for the dead.6
Americans were thus outraged when members of the Westboro
Baptist Church violated this code of respect. In 2005, Church
members began appearing at the funerals of fallen Iraqi War soldiers,
chanting and displaying slogans such as "They turned America over
to fags; now they're bringing them home in body bags," 7 and "Thank
God for dead soldiers. '
Although the protestors claim to
disseminate a political message about the sins of homosexuality, the
public has uniformly condemned their "repugnant, outrageous, [and]
despicable" behavior.'
The majority of states and Congress
responded to the country's outrage by enacting laws regulating
protests at or near funeral services. 10
It is easy to sympathize with the families and friends of the
deceased who experience funeral protests at the hands of the
Westboro Baptist Church.
In a time of extreme grief and
vulnerability, such activity must seem an affront of the most egregious
kind.
The instinct to regulate or punish is powerful and
understandable. Such regulation, however, poses significant issues
for freedom of speech. Although the First Amendment surely allows
government officials to regulate some protests near funerals, the
Supreme Court of the United States has generally paid close attention

3. See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Jr., Grave Matters: The Ancient Rights of the
Graveyard, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1469 (discussing common and statutory law relevant to

cemeteries).
4. Stanley French, The Cemetery as CulturalInstitution: The Establishmentof Mount
Auburn and the "Rural Cemetery" Movement, 26 AM. Q. 37, 38 (1974) (discussing the rise

and evolution of the American cemetery as a cultural institution).
5. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004); 5

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 450 (Mircea Eliade ed. 1987) ("[F]uneral rites.., are the
conscious cultural forms of one of our most ancient, universal, and unconscious impulses:
the need to overcome the distress of death and dying.").
6. GEORGE CRABB, ENGLISH SYNONYMES EXPLAINED 316 (1887) ("[Rlegard for

the feelings of others enjoins a certain outward decorum upon everyone who attends a
funeral."); Ronald K.L. Collins & David Hudson, A Funeralfor Free Speech?, LEGAL

TIMES, April 17, 2006, at 67 ("Decency respects the dead.").
7. Howard Witt, Lawmakers Rush to Blunt Anti-Gay Church, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4,

2006, at 1.
8. Lizette Alvarez, Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A14.

9. Id. (quoting Representative Steve Buyer (R-IN), who sponsored a bill in Congress
to limit protests at federal cemeteries) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. See infra note 37.
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to how and why officials regulate. Laws punishing protestors who
engage in fighting words" or who physically or aurally disrupt
Laws banning peaceful protests near a
funerals are one thing."
funeral ceremony in order to protect the "privacy of grieving
families" are quite another. 3 The former are grounded in legal
principles allowing regulation of low-value and disruptive speech,
assuming the laws are appropriately tailored. 4 The latter raise
numerous questions about the nature and scope of privacy
protections in public and their effect on free speech rights.
This Article focuses on the latter category of laws regulating
peaceful funeral protests and the claim that those laws protect privacy
interests.
The term "privacy," is amorphous, ill-defined, and
malleable, 5 and, therefore, a dangerous justification for regulating
speech. Statutes regulating peaceful protests reflect the difficulty
both in defining and containing the parameters of a privacy interest.
Such laws appear at first glance to equate privacy with intrusion,
much like the common law tort of intrusion. But the breadth of the
peaceful protest statutes is inconsistent with traditional elements of
the intrusion tort. Typically, intrusion torts involve a physical, aural,
or harassing invasion into one's solitude or other private space in an
especially offensive manner.1 6 In contrast, many peaceful protest
statutes exclude protestors from areas ranging from 300 to 1,500 feet
11. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303(a)(1) (2007) (prohibiting any person
from "[d]irect[ing] abusive epithets or mak[ing] any threatening gesture which the person
knows or reasonably should know is likely to provoke a violent reaction by another"
within 1,000 feet of funeral procession).
12. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (restricting protestors from
"willfully making or assisting in the making of any noise or diversion that disturbs or tends
to disturb the peace or good order of the funeral").
13. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1380 (2007) (prohibiting pickets within 500 feet
and one hour before or after a funeral).
14. For cases regarding fighting words, see generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 393 (1992); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972); and Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). For a treatment of disruptive protests, see Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972).
15. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1153 (2004) (noting that the term privacy is "embarrassingly
difficult to define"). For excellent reviews of the many notions of privacy in literature and
law, see generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477
(2006) [hereinafter, Solove, Taxonomy] and Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002) [hereinafter, Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy]. See also infra
Part II.A (discussing conceptions of privacy).
16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965) ("One who
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or
his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.").
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around a funeral service or procession,"7 belying any notion of
seclusion associated with an intrusion-based privacy interest.
Furthermore, because such laws target peaceful protests, officials
cannot legitimately claim that they protect against unwanted aural or
physical invasions.18 Peaceful protests do not invade funerals in the
sense that this term is traditionally understood. They are neither
noisy nor disruptive. They do not necessarily impede funeral services.
Nor do they involve harassment causing attendees to avoid the
service. In other words, peaceful protests do not invade funeralgoers' seclusion.
In effect, the only aspect of intrusion that these statutes capture
is that funeral protests offend mourners (and many others). The
Montana legislature has justified its funeral protest statute 19 by
finding that protesting at funerals "exploit[s] ...another's grief" in a

manner "shocking to the conscience" and that such activity is an
"unwanted and unwarranted intrusion" on the "sanctity and dignity
of funeral services."20 While this argument may be vaguely rooted in
privacy law, it differs from the law of intrusion.2' Such an approach
equates privacy with decency or civility, i.e., the notion that social
norms require certain decorum and respect for others.22
American law, however, does not recognize a civility-based
privacy interest. The privacy tort of intrusion rejects recovery for
purely "psychological" invasions such as insults and bad manners.23
Our free speech jurisprudence, which borrows heavily from the
intrusion branch of privacy torts when balancing privacy interests and
free speech rights, eschews regulation of speech based upon its
offensive content.24 But the Supreme Court's cases in this area are

17. See infra Part I.B.3.
18. Several states regulate only those protests likely to intrude upon funeral
ceremonies-i.e., noisy or physically disruptive protests. See infra Part I.B.2.
19. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-116 (2007).
20. Right to Grieve in Privacy Act, 2007 Mont. Laws 10 (codified at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-8-116 (2007)).
21. See infra Part II.B.2.
22. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2093
(2001) ("If privacy is conceived as a form of dignity, it presupposes a particular kind of
social structure in which persons are joined by common norms that govern the forms of
their social interactions. These norms constitute the decencies of civilization.").
23. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY § 5:89, at 625
(2d ed. 2007); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 390 (1960).

24. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 2122 (1971).
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complex, and it is difficult to discern the parameters of an audience

member's privacy interests, especially while in a public place.
The Court's tendency to discuss the privacy interest in the
context of audience "captivity" has further confused the issue.25 The
Court has not clearly explained the circumstances in which audiences
are captive or to what kind of expression they can be captive.
Further, the Court often uses broad, rhetorically powerful but often
unhelpful, language to support its decisions.26 Over time that rhetoric
has occasionally suggested a willingness to find audiences in public
captive to offensive speech, although such speech is not intrusive in a
2 8 the Court
traditional sense.27 Most recently, in Hill v. Colorado,

seemingly declared that privacy interests gave "unwilling
listeners" a
29
right to "avoid unwelcome speech" while in public.
Despite the Court's confusing signals, a careful review of its cases
reveals that persons who claim to be captive in public do not have a
general right to be free from unwanted speech. Rather, even after
Hill, an individual's privacy right while in public space amounts to
little more than freedom from noisy or disruptive protests or
harassing and intimidating behavior while in a defined area.30

Nevertheless, the confusion arising from the Court's decisions allows
states to rely on the broader aspects of the Court's language to justify
their peaceful protest statutes3 1 as necessary to protect funeral goers
from offensive messages.32 Lower courts have agreed, with all but
25. All of the Court's recent cases discuss privacy in the context of audience captivity.
See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-18 (2000); Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376 n.8;
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 772-73; Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988); see also infra
Parts III.B-C (discussing the Court's decisions regarding privacy in the context of public
places).
26. See infra Part III.A.
27. See infra, Part III.C.
28. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
29. Id. at 717.
30. See infra Parts III.B-C.
31. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (W.D. Mo. 2007),
(considering state's argument that funeral goers are "more captive than citizens in their
own homes" (emphasis in original)), rev'd, 509 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007); McQueary v.
Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (considering state's argument that it had
"an interest in protecting its citizens from unwanted communications"); State Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612 (N.D. Ohio
2007) (No. 1:06-CV-02038) (arguing that "[p]reventing [funeral goers] from becoming a
captive audience for unwelcome speech is the impetus behind the enactment of the
regulation"), affid sub nom. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 2008 FED App. 0312P, 539 F.3d
356 (6th Cir. 2008).
32. See, e.g., Appellees' Brief at 33, Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480 (8th Cir.
2007) (No. 07-1295) (arguing that Court's doctrine shows funeral goers are captive
audience with right to be free from exposure to "hateful messages").
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one court finding privacy interests sufficient to support regulation of
peaceful funeral protests.33
The lower courts' interpretations of the privacy interest,
however, extend it well beyond existing doctrine and essentially
create a civility-based privacy interest. Lower courts assume that
funeral goers are captive to protests simply because they attend an
event (a funeral) at which they find the protestors' presence or
message offensive. As one court noted, "protestors' actions of
picketing soldiers' funerals and belittling sacrifices made by soldiers
are intolerable ... , making protection of the funeral attendees a
substantial interest for the state."34 Such a civility-based approach
disconnects privacy and captivity from any logical notion of intrusion,
essentially punishing protestors for violating society's norms. The
states may have intended this civility-based approach with their
statutes, but the Supreme Court has never taken, and should not take,
this route. A civility-based privacy interest is firmly grounded in
communicative impact-regulating speech because of the audience's
response to it 3 5-and allows government officials to restrict speech
that offends us. Such laws effectively regulate speech because of its
content and rarely withstand constitutional scrutiny.36
None of this is to say that privacy interests are irrelevant to
funeral protest statutes. Instead, the parameters of that interest must
be drawn narrowly, to remain consistent with the principles
established in the Court's doctrine. That doctrine has always
recognized an intrusion-based privacy interest. Thus, funeral protest
statutes that conceive of the privacy interest in terms of freedom from
33. See Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (finding mourners sufficiently captive to protests
to support a privacy interest), rev'd, 509 F.3d 480 (intimating that state did not have an
interest in protecting privacy beyond the home); Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 618 (finding
funeral protestors' speech intruded upon mourners who were captive audience while
attending funeral).
34. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
35. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1497 (1975)
(describing regulations grounded in communicative impact as those in which "the harm
that the state is seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the defendant is
communicating, and more particularly out of the way people can be expected to react to
his message"); see also Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 656 (1991) ("When the harm [a] regulation seeks to
remedy necessarily flows from the communicative impact of the speech, then the
government's purpose is related to content and the regulation is deemed content
discriminatory.").
36. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989) (striking down statute banning flag
desecration in a manner offensive to other people as unconstitutionally regulating
communicative impact of speech).
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unwanted and invasive intrusions, and which regulate accordingly, are
consistent with the Court's existing doctrine and longstanding free
speech principles.
Part I of this Article discusses the recent spate of funeral protest
laws, focusing most specifically on those that regulate peaceful
funeral protests. Part II attempts to unpack the privacy interest that
underlies the peaceful protest statutes. It demonstrates that despite
state attempts to adopt an intrusion-based privacy right, peaceful
protest statutes actually embrace a civility-based privacy right. Yet,
privacy and free speech law in the United States do not recognize
civility-based privacy rights. Part III discusses the Court's free speech
jurisprudence relevant to the regulation of funeral protests. It
analyzes those cases in which privacy interests, and especially the
captive audience rationale, have figured prominently in the Court's
decisions. It ultimately concludes that the Court's doctrine does not
recognize a broad interest that defines privacy as freedom from
offensive or uncivil speech, even though the cases in this area send
somewhat conflicting signals.
Part IV analyzes recent lawsuits
challenging funeral protest laws and reveals that they confuse the
Court's doctrine.
Part IV also elaborates on the previously
unrecognized privacy interest identified in the lower court cases,
which like the statutes, equates privacy with civility norms. Finally,
Part IV discusses permissible funeral protest statutes in light of the
intrusion-based privacy interest consistent with the Court's doctrine.
I. REGULATING FUNERAL PROTESTS
A.

Background

The federal government and forty-one states have enacted
statutes restricting protests near cemeteries or funerals.37 The
37. See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1388 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-17
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21126 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 871.01 (2007); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6409 (Supp. 2008); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/26-6 (West Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-3 (LexisNexis Supp.
2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5 (West Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (2007);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.055, .145, .155 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:103 (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 501-A (Supp. 2007); MD.
CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272,
§ 42A (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 123.1112-13 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.501 (West Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-35-18 (West Supp. 2007); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 578.501 (West Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-116 (2007); NEB. REV.
STAT.

§§ 28-1320-01 to 1320.03 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:2-b (LexisNexis Supp.
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statutes are almost entirely a response to the activities of the
Westboro Baptist Church, an unaffiliated Baptist church consisting of
roughly seventy-five members located in Topeka, Kansas.38 The
church is led by the Reverend Fred Phelps and made up largely of
Phelps family members.3 9 Reverend Phelps and his followers began
protesting at funerals in 1991, and have since engaged in over 34,000
anti-gay protests. 40 The church, already well-known in Kansas which
passed a funeral picketing law as early as 1992,41 gained national
notoriety in 1998 for protesting at the funeral of Matthew Shephard, a
victim of anti-gay violence.42 Although the church continues its
activities at other prominent funerals,43 its recent protests at military

2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-8.1 (West Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT ANN. § 30-20B-1-5
(West Supp. 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.21 (McKinney 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14288.4 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01.1 (Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3767.30 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1380 (2007); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517 (West Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-525 (Supp. 2007);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-13-17 to 22-13-20 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-317
(2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.055,42.04 (Vernon Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-9-108 (Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771 (Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-415 (Supp. 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.84.030 (West Supp. 2008); WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 947.01, 947.011 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-105
(2007).
Kansas recently amended its statute. For a discussion of the changes to the
Kansas funeral protest statute, see infra note 41.
38. Alvarez, supra note 8; Fred Mann, Road to Westboro, WICHITA EAGLE, Apr. 2,
2006, at 1A.
39. Matt Sedensky, Ministry of Hate, HUTCHINSON NEWS (Kan.), June 4, 2006, at Al.
For background on the Phelps family, see Rick Musser, Fred Phelps Versus Topeka, in
CULTURE WARS & LOCAL POLITICS 158 (Elaine B. Sharpe ed. 1999).
40. See GodHatesFags, http://www.godhatesfags.com (last visited November 3, 2008).
41. See Musser, supra note 39, at 165-66 (discussing events leading up to enactment of
anti-picketing ordinance); see also 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 210 (setting forth provisions of an
enacted senate bill, which prohibited picketing "before or about any cemetery, church or
mortuary before, during and after a funeral"). A federal district court struck down the law
as unconstitutionally vague. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1315 (10th Cir. 1997)
(discussing lower court's unpublished order).
Kansas updated its funeral protest law in 2007. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015
(2007). The law contained a trigger provision stating that it would not go into effect until
the Attorney General prevailed in a lawsuit regarding the law's constitutionality. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-702a (2007). The Kansas Supreme Court held that the trigger provision
violated the separation of powers, and struck down the law in March 2008. See State ex
rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 179 P.3d 366, 390-91 (Kan. 2008). In early 2008, Kansas enacted
a funeral protest law substantially similar to the 2007 amended version, but without the
trigger language. S.B. 226, 2008 Kan. Sess. Laws 37, available at http://kslegislature.org/
sessionlaws/2008/chap37.pdf. For ease of reference, this Article will refer to the provisions
of section 21-4015.
42. Alvarez, supra note 8; Sedensky, supra note 39.
43. See Robert F. McCarthy, Note, The Incompatibility of Free Speech and Funerals:
A Grayned-Based Approach for Funeral Protest Statutes, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1469, 1474
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funerals have generated the greatest media attention and legislative
backlash.

Church members began protesting at funerals of soldiers killed in
Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005." At such funerals they sing, chant and
hold signs reading "God Hates Fags," "God Blew Up the Soldier,"
"Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Thank God for IEDs," and "AIDS
Cures Fags.""a Church members claim that soldiers' deaths are a

result of the country's willingness to embrace homosexuality. As one
church member noted, " 'God is punishing this nation with a grievous,
smiting blow, killing our children, sending them home dead, to help

you connect the dots .... This is a nation that has forgotten God and
leads a filthy manner of life.' "46 Church members choose funerals as
their protest venue because: (1) they believe that funeral attendees'
focus on death and dying make funeral ceremonies an appropriate
venue at which to warn of God's impending wrath, (2) funeral
services provide them with a "sounding board they would otherwise
lack," and (3) the government often uses military funerals as a
platform to promote a military agenda, which church members
believe they must negate with their message.47
Public response to the church's activities has been, not
surprisingly, quite negative. Their activities have been described as
"repugnant, outrageous, [and] despicable."" Community members

have described the protestors as "pieces of garbage who want to
(2007) (discussing church protests at funerals of Frank Sinatra, Barry Goldwater, Mister
Rogers, and others).
44. Alvarez, supra note 8; Sedensky, supra note 39. Prior to the Church's current
protests, members protested primarily at the funerals of gay men and lesbians, most
famously at the funeral of Matthew Shepard, a gay man who was beaten to death in
Wyoming. Alvarez, supranote 8; Sedensky, supra note 39.
45. See GodHatesFags, http://www.godhatesfags.com/written/wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html
(last visited November 3, 2008); Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church,
http://www.adl.org/special reports/wbc/wbc on-gays.asp (last visited November 3, 2008).
For more in-depth reviews of the Church's activities, see Lauren M. Miller, Comment, A
Funeralfor Free Speech? Examining the Constitutionality of FuneralPicketing Acts, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 1097, 1102-04 (2007) and Cynthia Mosher, Comment, What They Died to
Defend: Freedom of Speech and Military Funeral Protests, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 587,
592-95 (2007).
46. Alvarez, supra note 8 (quoting Shirley Phelps-Roper); see also GodHatesFags,
supra note 45 ("God has killed [soldiers] in Iraq/Afghanistan in righteous judgment
against an evil nation. America crossed the line on June 26, 2003, when the Supreme
Court (the conscience of the nation) ruled that we must respect sodomy.").
47. Mosher, supra note 45, at 593-94. In some instances, church members have
agreed to forego protests in exchange for alternate media coverage. Church members
argue that they do not protest at funerals where there will be no press coverage. Id. at
594.
48. Alvarez, supra note 8 (quoting Indiana Representative Steve Buyer).
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desecrate the memories of fallen servicemen and women."49 In fact,
members of the church call themselves "the most hated family in [the]
U.S.""0 The Westboro Baptist Church's protests at military funerals
have so offended the public and lawmakers that states and the federal
government have engaged in an extraordinary wave of legislative
activity, passing the laws referred to above in less than two years.
B.

The Statutes

Funeral protest statutes approach regulation in various ways.
Many regulate protests involving low-value speech, i.e., speech that is
"no essential part of any exposition of ideas."51 Accordingly, such
statutes regulate fighting words, incitement, or threats, i.e., categories
of speech deemed to have little expressive value. Other statutes
restrict high-value speech, i.e., speech contributing to public
discourse. 2
Some such statutes restrict loud, boisterous, and
disruptive protests.
Other statutes restrict peaceful protests near
churches, cemeteries, or other places where funerals are held. 4
Unlike statutes that regulate fighting words or incitement, which have
no expressive value, these latter statutes restrict speech that expresses
ideas. However, they do so because of the expression's undesirable
byproducts-for example, noise pollution, or invasion of mourners'
privacy interests.
Understanding these different approaches aids in understanding
the legitimacy of the government interests associated with the
statutes. In the world of free speech jurisprudence, government
interests are integral to determining the constitutionality of speech
49. Geoff Oldfather, A Good Way to Handle Westboro Protestors: Show Up and
Ignore Them, FORT PIERCE TRIB. (Fla.), May 21, 2008, available at http://www.
tcpalm.com/new/2008/may/21/geoff-oldfather-a-good-way-to-handle-protesters/.
50. BBCNews.com, America's Most Hated Family, Mar. 30, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/magazine/6507971.stm; see also Geoff Oldfather, Church's
Hate Group Won't Find Sympathy Picketing in Stuart, STUART NEWS (Fla.), May 18, 2008,
at Al, available at http://www.tcpalm.comlnews/2008/May/18/30gtchurchs-hate-groupwont-find-sympathy-in/
(describing church members' actions as "evil" and
"reprehensible").
51. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
52. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980) ("[T]he
First Amendment 'embraces at least the liberty to discuss publicly ... all matters of public
concern.' "); Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473,
481 (1997) (defining public discourse as "the speech necessary for the formation of public
opinion").
53. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-126 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5(1)
(West Supp. 2008).
54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 42A (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.501
(West Supp. 2008).
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regulations. Whether it regulates high- or low-value speech, the
government must have valid reasons for its actions. Many reasons
suffice, including preventing violence, traffic safety, aesthetics, and
privacy."
Government officials, however, cannot legitimately
regulate speech solely because of its communicative impact, i.e.,
because of the audience's response to the expression.56 Much of the

Court's free speech jurisprudence attempts to distinguish regulations
based on legitimate reasons from those based on communicative
impact.
Restrictions on low-value speech, for example, are constitutional

only if they are narrowly tailored to specific interests, such as
preventing violence; they cannot broadly regulate speech because
people are offended.57

Restricting speech due to the audience's

offense at the message violates the purpose associated with regulating
low-value speech, namely, that such speech has no expressive value.
In the realm of high-value speech, a law's constitutionality depends
on whether it is content-based or content-neutral. The Court strictly

scrutinizes content-based restrictions,58 in large part because they are
more likely to turn on communicative impact. 9 Content-neutral
regulations, on the other hand, are more likely to serve neutral state
interests. Courts uphold content-neutral regulations if they are
narrowly drawn to meet the state's interests and leave open ample
alternatives of communication.6" However, the Court may hold an
55. Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against
Expression, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 51 (2000) (describing legitimate interests in
Court's cases).
56. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
58. Under strict scrutiny, the Court asks whether the law is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 106 (1991).
59. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 207 (1983). As Professor Stone explains, when the government
restricts speech because it is fearful of how people will react, "it almost invariably relies on
constitutionally disfavored justifications," such as paternalism, or protecting people from
offense. Id. at 217. For discussions of potential motives underlying content-based laws,
see Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 451-56 (1996) and Christina E. Wells,
Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First
Amendment Jurisprudence,32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 173-75 (1997).
60. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding noise
regulation in city park); see also Wells, supra note 59, at 175-77 (discussing the Court's
approach to content-neutral regulations).
This synopsis assumes that protests occur in classic public fora (i.e., streets, parks,
and sidewalks). See Hague v. Comm. for Indust. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (discussing
the Court's approach to content-neutral regulations). Given the breadth of the zones from
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apparently content-neutral law to be content-based if the state's
interest in regulating is related to communicative impact.6
1. Statutes Regulating Low-Value Speech
Many states have enacted funeral protest statutes targeting
certain categories of low-value speech, such as threats, fighting words
or incitement of violent activity.62 Delaware, for example, prohibits
anyone from "directing abusive epithets or making any threatening
gesture which the person knows or reasonably should know is likely
to provoke a violent reaction by another."6 3 North Carolina prohibits
displaying visual images that convey "fighting words or actual or
imminent threats of harm directed to any person or property
associated with the funeral."' Wisconsin outlaws "abusive, indecent,
[and] profane" conduct that "tends to cause or provoke a

disturbance" at a funeral service.65
which funeral protestors are excluded, see infra note 97 and accompanying text, much of
the speech at issue will occur in such fora. Many laws, however, also effectively ban
protestors from cemetery grounds or buildings. The Court's rules differ with respect to
these areas. Private property owners may exclude others, even those engaging in
expressive activity, from their property. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976).
Furthermore, a publicly owned cemetery is almost surely a non-public forum where
restrictions on speech need only be reasonable and not an effort to suppress viewpoints.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see also Griffin
v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding national
cemeteries are nonpublic fora). Most of the laws regulating disruptive protests are not
likely to fall afoul of the Court's prohibition on viewpoint suppression in non-public fora.
But see 18 U.S.C. § 1388(a) (2006) (prohibiting certain disruptive protests within 150 feet
of a funeral of a "member or former member of the Armed Forces that is not located at a
cemetery under the control of the National Cemetery Administration or part of Arlington
National Cemetery"); FLA. STAT. § 871.01(2) (2006) (prohibiting intentionally disruptive
protests at ceremonies honoring the deaths of military personnel).
61. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (striking down facially neutral
breach of peace law because it was applied to punish protestors for peaceful expression of
unpopular views); Kagan, supra note 59, at 464; Stone, supra note 59, at 215 n.102.
62. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2(b)(1) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-6(c)(2)
(West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5(1)(b) (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 525.055(1)(a)(1) (West 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 501-A(1)(D) (2007); MD.
CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 10-205(b) (Lexis Nexis 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 123.1113
(2008); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:33-8.1(b)(2) (2008); N.M. STAT. § 30-20B-1-5 (2007); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(8)(a) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01.1 (2007); VA.
CODE. ANN. § 18.2-415(B) (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.84.030(1)(a) (2008);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 947.011(2)(a)(1) (West 2007). A handful of statutes also prohibit

certain conduct, such as starting fights, at funerals. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-45-1-3(a)
(2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.055(1)(a)(1)
§ 9A.84.030(d)(i) (2008).

(West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE

63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1303(a)(1) (2007).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(8)(a) (2007).
65. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 947.011(2)(a)(1), 947.01 (West 2005).
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In general, the government has legitimate reason to regulate lowvalue speech, even though such regulation is based at least partly

upon the expression's communicative impact. Laws regulating lowvalue speech, however, are unlike laws that regulate because the
audience dislikes the speaker's message. Restrictions on low-value

speech do not punish speech because of its appeal to our rational or
deliberative capacities but, rather, because it provokes an unthinking,
non-deliberative response.66 Thus, the government may regulate
fighting words and incitement because these forms of speech are
intended and likely to result in immediate violence.67 Similarly, the

government may regulate some types of threats due to the fear and
disruption they cause. 6 Although officials regulate low-value speech

because of the audience's response, there is less concern about
censorship of ideas than with high-value speech.
Nevertheless, the Court carefully polices the boundaries of low-

value speech to ensure that officials do not unduly suppress highvalue speech simply because they dislike its message. Accordingly, it
has established strict tests for judging when speech is deemed to be

low-value. Officials cannot, for example, punish speech that is
offensive under the guise of punishing fighting words. 69 Rather, the
Court limits punishment of fighting words to those words that "have a
direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom,
individually" they are addressed.7 ° Similarly, officials can punish
advocacy of illegal conduct only if it is "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite or produce

66. Wells, supra note 59, at 180; see also Kagan, supra note 59, at 480 ("In holding that
a legislature may prohibit fighting words, the Court is doing no more than approving a
governmental response to an immediate danger of violence. The premise of the category,
no less than of a clear-and- present-danger test, is that the government would respond to
such a danger no matter what its views of the ideas affected.").
67. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (discussing incitement); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (discussing fighting words).
68. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (discussing state interests in
regulating threats).
69. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that under our
Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.").
70. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972); see also Wells, supra note 59, at 180
(noting that the Court allows punishment of fighting words because they are "designed to
induce us to react violently and without thinking").
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such action."'" Finally, government officials cannot punish hyperbole
or political rhetoric under the pretext of punishing threats.
Funeral protest statutes incorporating low-value speech
principles reflect a desire to prevent violence or intimidation of
mourners attending funeral ceremonies. Such interests are legitimate
assuming the legislation is narrowly tailored. Some funeral protest
statutes, however, may exceed the scope of the Court's low-value
speech jurisprudence. For example, Georgia's law prohibits the use
of "fighting words" but never defines that term, leaving the speaker
and state officials to guess at its meaning.73 Although courts may
construe "fighting words" consistently with existing Georgia law,74
lack of definition in the text leaves law enforcement officials with
discretion to punish speech they dislike-certainly an imaginable
occurrence given the public's sympathy for mourners and antipathy
toward protestors. The Court, however, fears such discretion when
reviewing statutes purporting to regulate low-value speech, 75 hence its
strict requirements with respect to each category of low-value speech.
Wisconsin's statute, which prohibits the use of "abusive,
indecent, [or] profane" language that "tends" to cause a disturbance,76
also poses problems. The statute reaches beyond the Court's
definition of fighting words and punishes the mere use of profanity in
71. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); see also Wells, supra note 59,
at 179 (noting that incitement of illegal activity "does not appeal to our thought
processes ... [but] is designed to elicit an unthinking, animalistic response").
72. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982); Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969); see generally Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings:
How the Facts Govern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (2006)
(discussing the scope and the purpose of Court's threats doctrine).
73. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2(b)(1) (2007). To date, there has been no challenge
to the fighting words portion of the Georgia statute. The only challenge to the Georgia
statute has involved the prohibitions of intentionally disruptive protests contained in
sections 16-11-34.2(b)(2) and (4). See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-34.2(b)(2), (4) (2007). In
Hood v. Perdue, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2008), a federal district court dismissed
the challenge because plaintiffs, an individual protestor and an organization advocating for
the homeless, did not have standing. Id. at 1360. According to the court, plaintiffs,
although likely to protest near funerals, did not intend to disrupt funerals, and could not
show that the statute would be applied to them. Id. Thus, they had no standing to bring a
facial challenge. Id.
74. Georgia's disorderly conduct statute defines fighting words in a manner that
attempts to track the Court's modern jurisprudence. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39(a)(3)
(2007). Given that the Supreme Court will read language in light of analogous statutes,
see Grayned v. City of Rockford 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972), courts may read the funeral
protest statute in light of the disorderly conduct definition.
75. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (striking down a law
punishing the use of opprobrious words or abusive language because it left "wide open the
standard of responsibility... [and] was susceptible to improper application").
76. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 947.011(2)(a)(1), 947.01 (West 2007).
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circumstances where the speech is not directed at a particular
individual and violence is unlikely. 7 Although the statute requires

that the speaker "inten[d] to disrupt the service," without the other
limitations built into the fighting words doctrine, law enforcement
officials can find the requisite intent to disrupt a funeral in the mere
act of protesting.
Thus, significant problems potentially could arise with the

Georgia and Wisconsin statutes. Although both laws attempt to
regulate low-value speech, they encompass far more than speech that
actually falls into the category of fighting words. Both states should
consider following the lead of other states with funeral protest laws

that more specifically track the Court's definition of low-value
speech. Maine's statute, for example, prohibits a person from
"knowingly accost[ing], insult[ing], taunt[ing] or challeng[ing] any
person in mourning or in attendance at the funeral ... with

[communications] that would in fact have a direct tendency to cause a
violent response by the
ordinary person in mourning and in
78
attendance at a funeral.

2. Statutes Regulating Disruptive Protests
The second category of laws regulating funeral protests focuses
less on speech that causes violence or intimidation than it does on
speech that causes aural or physical disruptions. Iowa, for example
prohibits protestors from intentionally or recklessly making "loud and

raucous noises which cause unreasonable distress to the persons
attending [a] funeral .... ,,79Likewise, the federal statute prohibits
demonstrations in which "any individual willfully mak[es] or assist[s]
77. In Cohen v. California,403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971), the Court rejected the notion that
officials could punish profane words simply to civilize discourse. Wisconsin courts have
held the language used in its funeral protest statute to be constitutional in the context of a
broader disorderly context statute. See State v. Schwebke, 627 N.W.2d 213, 220 (Wis.
2001). However, the case on which they rely, State v. Zwicker, 164 N.W.2d 512 (Wis.
1969), was decided before Cohen. Other states' courts have held that statutes banning
profane words must be narrowed to comply with the Court's fighting words jurisprudence.
See 12 AM. JUR. 2D Blasphemy & Profanity § 13 (2008); 4 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW
§ 514 (2007).
78. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 501-A(1)(D) (2007); see also VA. CODE. ANN.
§ 18.2-415(B) (West 2007) (criminalizing any disruption that has "a direct tendency to
cause acts of violence by the person or persons at whom, individually, the disruption is
directed").
79. IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.5(1)(a) (West 2007); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21126 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2(b)(2) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-6(c)(1)
(2007); IND. CODE § 35-45-1-3(a)(2) (2007); KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.055(1)(a)(2)
(West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(8)(b) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01.1
(2007) (each containing similar provisions to the Iowa statute).

2008]

PRIVACY AND FUNERAL PROTESTS

in the making of any noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to
disturb the peace or good order of the funeral .
"..."80
Other statutes
prohibit protestors from blocking access to funeral services or funeral
processions."' Rather than regulate speech because it has little value,
such statutes generally regulate protests that qualify as high-value
speech, 2 but they do so based on the consequences of the protests,
such as traffic disruption or noise pollution. The constitutionality of
these laws will likely depend on whether they are content-neutral and
carefully drafted.83
Laws regulating disruptive funeral protests appear to be contentneutral. Most do not regulate speech based upon its content but,
rather, limit protests in specific locations near funeral ceremonies.'
The Court has routinely considered similar regulations to be contentneutral."
Additionally, it has recognized state interests in noise
80. 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
Several states have enacted parallel
provisions. See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1303(a)(2) (2007); FLA. STAT. § 871.01(2) (2007); IDAHO CODE § 18-6409(2) (2007); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103(7) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:2-b(II)(a) (West 2007);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.21 (McKinney 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-525(A) (2007);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-108(2) (West 2007).
81. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-17(a)(1)-(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 1611-34.2(b)(3) (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-6(c)(3) (West 2007); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 525.155(1) (Lexis 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103(A)(8) (2007); MD.
CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 10-205(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:2b(II)(b) (2007); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:33-8.1(b)(1) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14288.4(a)(8)(c) (2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055(3)(C) (Vernon Supp. 2008); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 947.011(2)(a)(2) (West 2007).
82. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972) (recognizing that
noisy demonstrations may be restricted but assuming that they were still expressive);
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (noting that statute regulating picketing
regulated "expressive conduct").
My attempt to categorize these laws is somewhat inexact. It can be difficult to
distinguish between statutes regulating low-value speech and statutes regulating highvalue but disruptive speech. Several statutes contain provisions falling into both
categories, and occasionally a law contains a single provision covering both contexts. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(8)(b) (2007) (prohibiting the use of threatening and
abusive language, and singing, chanting, whistling, or yelling that would "tend to impede,
disrupt, disturb or interfere with a funeral"). Many laws in the second category are further
labeled as "breach of peace" laws, which is a term commonly associated with fighting
words and incitement convictions, although I placed the laws involving such convictions in
the first category. I nevertheless categorized these laws differently because the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence distinguishes between protests that are disruptive but nevertheless
have an expressive component and protests that, although technically speech, have little
expressive value.
83. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
84. But see supra note 60 and infra note 118 regarding possibly content-based laws.
85. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988) (considering law regulating
targeted residential protests); Grayned 408 U.S. at 113 (considering law regulating
picketing near schools). In Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000), the Court
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86
control, traffic disruption, and ensuring access to medical services.

Such statutes nonetheless face two hurdles regarding their
constitutionality.
protests may be
regulating disruptive
First, laws
unconstitutionally vague. The Court requires that statutes give
persons of ordinary intelligence sufficient notice of which actions are
prohibited.87

Vague statutes delegate too much discretion to law

enforcement officials, allowing them to apply the law in an arbitrary
or discriminatory manner.88 Consequently, vague statutes may chill
First Amendment freedoms since "[u]ncertain meanings inevitably
lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' ... than if the

boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."89
Funeral statutes prohibiting protests that "disturb the peace or
tend to disturb the peace," "disturb or disrupt the funeral," and
"interrupt or disturb" a funeral are so imprecise that they could raise
vagueness concerns. Such phrases give little guidance to regulators
and allow them to gauge disruptiveness based upon the crowd's

response (i.e., because of communicative impact).

For example,

Idaho's statute, which prohibits anyone from "maliciously and

willfully disturb[ing] the dignity or reverential nature of any
funeral,"9 0 practically invites enforcement based upon the protestors'

message or audience response. Not surprisingly, the Court has
frequently overturned protestors' convictions under similarly broad
"breach of peace" or "disorderly protest" statutes. 91

At the same time, the Court does not require mathematical
precision in drafting statutes regulating disruptive protests. In

reaffirmed that laws regulating protests at specific locations, without more, are contentneutral. For criticism of Hill, see infra note 301.
86. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 769-75 (1994)
(egress/ingress to buildings); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 120 (noise disruption); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (traffic safety and disruption).
87. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
88. Grayned,408 U.S. at 108-09; Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162.
89. Grayned,408 U.S. at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
90. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6409(2) (2007).
91. See, e.g, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (striking down convictions of
peaceful protestors under statute punishing persons congregating in public places "with
intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the
peace may be occasioned thereby"); see also Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112
(1969) (overturning convictions when there was no evidence that a prohibition against
specific disorderly conduct was violated); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236
(1963) ("[C]riminal convictions [did not] result from the evenhanded application of a
precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain
specific conduct be limited or proscribed.").
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Grayned v. City of Rockford,92 the Court upheld a statute prohibiting
anyone adjacent to a school where classes were in session from
"willfully mak[ing] or assist[ing] in the making of any noise or
diversion which disturb[ed] or tend[ed] to disturb the peace or good
order" of school sessions.93 The Court acknowledged that the
statute's use of imprecise phrases such as "tends to disturb" presented
a close question.94 However, reading the statute in light of its
preamble, limiting constructions, intent requirement, and other
Supreme Court decisions, the Court upheld the ordinance. Taken
together, such factors sufficiently delineated that the prohibited
activity involved noisy behavior near a school likely to cause an
imminent disruption of school sessions.
Thus, funeral protest
statutes that successfully track the Grayned formula, as does the
federal statute, may avoid vagueness challenges.9 6 Much may depend
on the specific wording of statutes, the clarity with which they identify
the prohibited activity, the required mens rea, and whether they
provide sufficient criteria for law enforcement officials to apply the
law in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Second, some statutes regulating disruptive protests may be
insufficiently tailored to satisfy constitutional scrutiny. To survive the
intermediate scrutiny associated with content-neutral laws, funeral
protest statutes must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant state
interest. Most funeral protest statutes contain bubble zones ranging
from 100-500 feet.97 The necessity of large bubble zones to protect
against noisy disruptions or to ensure ingress and egress at funerals is
questionable. Although the Court has upheld a thirty-six-foot buffer
zone around a medical clinic, it has found larger zones unnecessarily

92. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
93. Id. at 108.
94. Id. at 100-11.
95. Id. at 110-12.
96. 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (prohibiting any individual from "willfully

making or assisting in the making of any noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb
the peace or good order of the funeral" within 150 feet of an entrance to cemetery
property).
97. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-126 (2007) (prohibiting "electronically

amplified funeral picketing within one hundred and fifty feet of [a] funeral site"); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 723.5(1) (West 2007) (prohibiting loud noises and other disruptions "within
500 feet of the building or other location where a funeral ... is being conducted"); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 240.21 (McKinney 2007) (prohibiting "mak[ing] unreasonable noise or

disturbance while at a lawfully assembled religious service or within one hundred feet
thereof, with intent to cause annoyance or alarm or recklessly creating a risk thereof");
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01.1 (2007) (prohibiting "loud singing, chanting, playing of

music ... within three hundred feet of any ingress or egress of [a] funeral site").
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broad to protect the state's interest.98 Grayned noted that "[tihe
nature of a place [and] 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations of time, place and manner that are
reasonable,' "" which suggests that broader zones might be warranted

in some circumstances. Funeral ceremonies are certainly candidates
for larger quiet zones than many activities. The breadth of the
statutory zones, however, raise questions about their necessity to
protect against aural or physical disruption.
Furthermore, insufficiently tailored laws raise concerns that
government officials operate on pretext,' ° which brings one back to
the legitimacy of the government's interest. Large bubble zones raise
questions as to whether officials attempt to protect against breaches
of the peace and noisy disruptions or, rather, use such interests as a
pretext for regulating speech they dislike. In addition, many statutes
regulating disruptive protests rely on a privacy interest. As discussed
more fully below, large bubble zones do not protect an intrusionbased privacy interest. Rather, they attempt to preserve a civilitybased privacy interest that is grounded in communicative impact. 1 '

To the extent that statutes regulating disruptive protests rely on a
privacy interest, they suffer from the same problems as those
associated with peaceful protest laws.

3. Statutes Regulating Peaceful Protests
The final category of funeral protest laws involves statutes
regulating all protests, even peaceful protests. 10 2 Such laws have a
98. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 775 (1994) (upholding
injunctive provision imposing thirty-six-foot buffer zone around medical clinic but striking
down three-hundred-foot provision around residences of clinic personnel as unnecessary
to meet state interest).
99. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116 (quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Constitution on the
Campus, 22 VAND L. REV. 1027, 1042 (1969)).
100. Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and
Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 36 (2003) ("[L]egislative
precision requirements.., ensure the sincerity and legitimacy of governmental purpose.");
Wells, supra note 55, at 58 (insufficiently tailored speech zones "raise[] suspicion that they
aim at something more than [the government's proffered] interest"); see also Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943) (noting that the city's interest in residential
privacy "can so easily be controlled by traditional legal methods, leaving to each
householder the full right to decide whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that
stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the
naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas").
101. See infra Part lI.B.
102. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-17(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-126 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2(b)(4) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214015(e) (2007); MD. CODE CRIM. LAW § 10-205(c) (LexisNexis 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS
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common template. Typically, they regulate one or all of the following

types of expressive activity: demonstrations, protests, pickets,
parades, processions, and assemblies. 3 Many do not define the
terms they use, leaving law enforcement officials with broad authority

to determine whether expressive activity falls within the statute. 1 4
Some statutes provide definitions, although they are often unhelpful.
For example, Nebraska defines "picketing" as "protest activities
engaged in by a person or persons located within three hundred feet
of a cemetery, mortuary, church or other place of worship during a

funeral."'0 5 Other definitions are more specific. Pennsylvania, for
example, defines "demonstration activities" as:
(1) Any picketing or similar conduct.
(2) Any oration, speech or use of sound amplification
equipment or device or similar conduct that is not part of a
commemorative service.
(3) The display of any placard, sign banner, flag or similar
device, unless such display is part of a commemorative service.

(4) The distribution of any handbill, pamphlet, leaflet or other
written or printed matter, other than a program distributed as
part of a commemorative service.10 6

ANN. ch. 272, § 42A (West 2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (West Supp. 2008); MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 45-8-1 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.03 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3767.30 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1380(D) (2007); PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7517(b) (West Supp. 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-13-17, 22-13-19

(2007); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-17-317 (2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055(3)(A)
(Vernon Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771(b) (2007); WYO. STAT. § 6-6-105
(2007).
103. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-126 (2007).
104. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 42A (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 22-13-17 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (West Supp. 2008); MD. CODE
CRIM. LAW § 10-205(c) (LexisNexis 2007); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-17-317 (West 2007);
WYO. STAT. § 6-6-105 (2007).
105. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.02(2) (2007); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1380(c)(2)
(2007) (defining "picketing" as protest activities taking place within 500 feet and a certain
time of funeral services); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771(a)(2) (2007) (defining "picketing"
as "protest, demonstration or other similar activity directed at a funeral service").
106. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(c) (West Supp. 2008); see also ALA. CODE § 13A11-17(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (defining "protest" as "including, but not limited to
protest with or without using an electric sound amplification device, that involves singing,
chanting, whistling, yelling, or honking a motor vehicle horn"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214015(d)(2) (2007) (defining "public demonstration" as "any picketing or similar conduct"
or "any oration, speech, use of sound amplification equipment or device, or similar
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delineates

prohibited activities, it nevertheless restricts a wide range of peaceful
expression.
Most peaceful protest laws also contain spatial restrictions (i.e.,
bubble zones), time restrictions, or, more often, both. The most
common restriction limits protests within 500 feet of funeral services
from one hour before to one hour after the funeral.0 7 Several
statutes substitute 300 feet for 500 feet,0 8 while others regulate
protestors in areas ranging from 100 feet0 9 to 1,500 feet."0 Some
states rely primarily on time restrictions with only general references
to spatial restrictions. For example, Missouri restricts protests "in
front of or about any location at which a funeral is held" within one
hour before or after a funeral."' Conversely, other statutes place
clear spatial limits on protests with less well-defined time limits. For
example, Tennessee creates a 500-foot bubble zone for "[p]icketing,
112
protesting, or demonstrating at a funeral or memorial service."
These bubble zones are designed to protect a wide variety of

ceremonial activities. The majority of statutes regulate protests near
"funerals" or "funeral services."1

3

On occasion these terms are not

conduct that is not part of a funeral"); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-8-1 (1991) (using similar
definition).
107. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-17(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-11-34.2(b)(4) (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1380(D) (2007); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7517(b) (West Supp. 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055(3)(A) (Vernon Supp.
2008).
108. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.03 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30
(LexisNexis Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. § 6-6-105 (2007). Nebraska's time limit ranges from
one hour before to two hours after the funeral service. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.03
(2007).
109. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771(b) (Supp. 2007).
110. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-8-1 (1991).
111. Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (Supp. 2008). Missouri enacted a contingent statute
that takes effect if the original statute is ever "finally declared void or unconstitutional by
a court of competent jurisdiction and upon notification by the attorney general." MO.
REV. STAT. § 578.503 (West Supp. 2007). The contingent statute establishes a 300-foot
buffer zone. MO. REV. STAT. § 578.502 (West Supp. 2007). The Eighth Circuit has
indicated that the "in front or about" language in Missouri's existing law may be too vague
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 487-88 (8th Cir.
2007). However, the case is still in the preliminary injunction stage, and no court has ruled
dispositively on the law's constitutionality. Id. at 485.
112. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-17-317(a)-(b) (2007); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 272, § 42A (West 2007) (prohibiting "picket[ing], loiter[ing], or otherwise creat[ing] a
disturbance within five hundred feet of ...where funeral services are being held").
113. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-17 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 587.502 (West Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-1 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 281320-01 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3771 (Supp. 2007); WYO. STAT. § 6-6-105 (2007).
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defined,'1 4 although most statutes provide at least a minimal
definition.
For example, Montana defines "funerals" as "the
ceremonies, rituals, and memorial services held in connection with
the memorial of a deceased person or in connection with the burial,
cremation, or other disposition of a human body, including the
assembly and dispersal of the persons attending the funeral.""' Many
statutes extend their prohibition of protesting to funeral
processions." 6 Others specifically exclude processions. "7
Courts will likely treat laws regulating peaceful protests as
facially content-neutral 1 8 because, by their terms, they do not
regulate content. It is less clear, however, whether such statutes
regulate protests because of their communicative impact. Most states
regulate peaceful funeral protests based on mourners' privacy
interests." 9 The preambles or statutory statements of several laws

114. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. § 6-6-105 (2007).
115. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-8-1(5)(a) (2007); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 3771(a)(1) (2007) (defining "funeral service" as "the ceremonies, rituals, and memorial
services held at a church, mortuary, cemetery, or home in connection with the burial or
cremation of a dead person").
116. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-126 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2(b)(3)
(2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015(d)(1) (1995 & 2007); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW
§ 10-205(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2007); Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (West Supp. 2008); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1380(C)(1)
(2007); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(c) (West Supp. 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 22-13-20 (2007); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-17-317(b) (West 2007); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 42.055(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
117. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.02(1) (2007).
118. To date, courts have treated peaceful protest statutes coming before them as
content-neutral. See infra Part IV.A. One could argue, however, that some statutes are
more problematic than others. Pennsylvania's statute, for example, prohibits distribution
of circulars or display of signs that are "not part of a commemorative service." See supra
text accompanying note 106. One could argue that this prohibition textually carves out
certain subject matter for protection and is thus facially content-based. Cf. C. Edwin
Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place and
Manner Regulations, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 954-55 (1984) (discussing whether exemption
of funeral processions from parade permit requirements is content-based). On the other
hand, Grayned treated as content-neutral a statute limiting protests near schools in order
to protect the "peace and good order" of the school. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972). Such a law clearly singled out school activities for protection,
although it did not do so because such activities had an expressive component. Rather, it
simply attempted to protect school activities from disruption. Whether Pennsylvania's law
is facially content-based or content-neutral may depend on whether one views the
language protecting expression that is part of a commemorative service as an attempt to
protect the expressive aspects of funeral ceremonies or an attempt to protect the process
of the ceremony from disruption.
119. States also often use the same interests to justify laws restricting disruptive
protests. This is especially true of statutes that include restrictions on both peaceful and
disruptive protests. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2 (2007).
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12
explicitly evoke the "privacy of grieving families.""
Oklahoma's
statute, for example, states that "the interests of families in privately
and peacefully mourning the loss of deceased relatives are violated
when funerals are targeted for picketing and other public
demonstrations ....
[P]icketing of funerals causes emotional
disturbance and distress to grieving families who participate in
'
funerals." 21
Kansas's funeral protest statute notes the "substantial
'
privacy interest in funerals."122
State officials also refer to privacy
interests to justify statutes. For example, Ohio officials characterized
their statute as necessary to prevent "untrammeled intrusion upon
'
[mourners'] private grief."123
Privacy is unquestionably a legitimate interest supporting state
regulation, but that concept is not self-defining. Without further
definition it is impossible to know whether the privacy interest on
which states rely is neutral or related to communicative impact. The
next part identifies and discusses the concept of privacy underlying
peaceful funeral protest statutes. Part III then discusses how that
interest fits, if at all, within the Court's jurisprudence.

II. PRIVACY INTERESTS AND FUNERAL PROTESTS
A.

Conceptions of Privacy

Privacy has been particularly difficult to capture as a unitary
concept. Accordingly, the legal and philosophical literature is rife
with different definitions of the term. In its broadest sense, privacy
has been described as the "right to be let alone," a definition
associated with Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's influential
article, The Right to Privacy.12 4 Spurred by their perception of
increasingly intrusive press reports, Warren and Brandeis argued that
120. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015(c)(1) (2007); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-126
(2007) ("protect the privacy of mourners"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1320.01 (2007) ("rights
of families to peacefully and privately mourn"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21; § 1380(A)(1)(b)
(2007) ("interests of families in privately and peacefully morning"); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 7517(a)(2) (West Supp. 2008) (same); Right to Grieve in Privacy Act, 2007 Mont. Laws
13, 14 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-116 (2007)).
121. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1380(A)(1) (2007).
122. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015(c)(2) (1995 & 2007).
123. State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 31, at 10; see also
Appellees' Brief, supra note 32, at 34 (characterizing state interest as protecting "the
rights of its citizens 'to be let alone' as they mourn the loss of loved ones").
124. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890). Warren and Brandeis receive much of the credit for the phrase although
they adopted it from Judge Cooley. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed.
1888).
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the elements of a privacy right already existed at common law and
that it deserved independent recognition in order to protect the right
125
of "inviolate personality" and to protect against emotional distress.
While the Warren and Brandeis article provides the foundation
for much of privacy law in the United States, 126 the phrase "right to be
let alone" is too broad to be a useful definitional tool. 127 Thus, the

law and scholars have attempted to fill this void with more specific, if
widely varying, definitions of privacy. Some scholars describe privacy
primarily as a right that entitles a person "to exclude others from
128
watching, utilizing [or otherwise] invading their private realm.'
The privacy tort of intrusion 129 and the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence 3 ° embrace versions of this notion. Other
theorists focus on privacy as primarily encompassing control over

125. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 124, at 198-205 (arguing that law's protection of
one's "thoughts, sentiments, and emotions" from publication was not based on a narrow
property right but on a right of inviolate personality).
126. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 15, at 1099-1100 (noting that the
Warren and Brandeis article became the basis of four tort actions for invasion of privacy);
Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy In Tort Law-Were Warren & Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 327 (1966) (referring to the article as the "most influential law
review article of all" time); Prosser, supra note 23, at 849-50 (detailing the development of
privacy law after the Warren and Brandeis article).
127. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1979) (noting that
Warren and Brandeis's definition was "too imprecise for judicial construction and
principled application"); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
233, 263 (1977) (arguing that the "evocation" of the right to be let alone is of "little or no
help" in understanding the balance of privacy and other rights); Solove, Conceptualizing
Privacy, supra note 15, at 1102 ("[D]efining privacy as the right to be let alone is too
broad.").
128. Ernest Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in PRIVACY 149, 149 (J. Ronald Pennock &
John. W. Chapman eds., 1971). Other scholars express variations on this theme. Michael
Weinstein refers to privacy as "a condition of being apart from others" and specifically the
"condition of voluntary limitation of communication to or from certain others, in a
situation, with respect to specified information, for the purpose of conducting an activity
in pursuit of a perceived good." Michael A. Weinstein, The Uses of Privacy in the Good
Life, in PRIVACY, supra, at 88, 94. Richard Parker argues that "privacy is control over
when and by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others." Richard B. Parker, A
Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 281 (1974).
129. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("Where, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance
is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (noting that what a person "seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected"). For
a discussion of the privacy interest in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see
Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WiS. L. REV. 1335, 1357-74.
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personal information.' The privacy torts involving public disclosure
of private facts and false light invasion of privacy involve similar
notions of control over one's personal information. 3
Still other

scholars describe privacy as protecting against conduct that is
"demeaning to individuality [or an] affront to personal dignity."' 33 In
this sense, privacy is a means of protecting personhood. The
Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence regarding
34
bodily autonomy most readily reflects this conception of privacy,

although rhetoric regarding personhood occasionally appears in
connection with other legal issues as well.'35

131. For example, Alan Westin has described privacy as "the claim of individuals,
groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others." ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 7 (1967). Charles Fried similarly argues that privacy revolves around the
"control we have over information about ourselves." Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J.
475, 482 (1968); see also Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY, supra note
128, at 169, 169 (describing privacy as "control over acquaintance with one's personal
affairs by the one enjoying it"); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 25

(1971) (defining privacy as "the individual's ability to control the circulation of
information relating to him").
132. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 16, § 652D (recognizing
a privacy tort regarding publicity given to private life); id. § 652E (recognizing a privacy
tort regarding publicity placing person in false light).
133. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973-74 (1964); see also Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom
and Respect for Persons, in PRIVACY, supra note 128, at 1, 6 (arguing that actions invade
privacy because they fail "to show proper respect for persons" by "treating people as
objects or specimens-like 'dirt'-and not as subjects with sensibilities, ends, and
aspirations of their own"); Robert Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy, Community,
and Self in Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 965 (1989) (noting that the intrusion
tort empowers plaintiffs "to uphold the interests of social personality which are necessarily
impaired by a defendant's breach of a civility rule").
134. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). For discussions of
the Court's jurisprudence, see Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 15, at 1117;
Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85,
108-09 (1991); and Gary L. Bostwick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose,
Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision,64 CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1466, 1478 (1976).
135. For example, the Court has referenced concepts of personhood in its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, although notions of intrusion generally dominate this area of
the law. Whitman, supra note 15, at 1213-14. Similarly, Professors Post and Bloustein
posit that the desire to protect dignity underlies the intrusion tort. See Bloustein, supra
note 133, at 973-74; Post, supra note 133, at 965. For further discussion, see infra notes
179-84 and accompanying text.
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Privacy, Peaceful Protest Statutes, and FirstAmendment
Concerns

Statutes regulating peaceful funeral protests purport to embrace
a privacy interest that protects against unwanted intrusions. For
example, Montana's statute explicitly protects funeral goers against
"unwanted intrusion by strangers." ' 36 Colorado's law prohibits
'
protests that "disrupt[] the fundamental grieving process." 137
Other
statutes prohibit the violation of "the rights of families to peacefully
and privately mourn," implying that protestors intrude into an
otherwise peaceful situation.138 State officials also describe protests as
intrusions on privacy.139
To say that peaceful protests intrude upon mourners' privacy,
however, begs the question: "how?" The meaning of "intrude" is no
more self-evident than the meaning of "privacy." Without further
elaboration, such a privacy interest remains amorphous.14 ° However,
the common law tort of invasion of privacy presents a reasonably
fleshed-out conception of intrusion and can provide a framework for
discussing privacy interests underlying peaceful funeral protest
statutes. 141 This conception is also related to privacy interests
recognized in free speech law, providing further reason to use it to
142
assess statutes regulating speech.

136. Right to Grieve in Privacy Act, 2007 Mont. Laws 13-14 (codified at MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-8-116 (2007)) (referring to mourners' "privacy rights"); see also KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4015(b)(2) (2007) (noting family members' "personal stake in honoring and

mourning their dead").
137. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-126 (2007); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-34.2(a)

(2007) (referring to mourners' right to attend funeral without unwanted disturbance or
disruption).
138. NEB.

REV.

STAT.

§ 28-1320.01

(2007);

see

also OKLA.

STAT.

tit.

21;

§ 1380(A)(1)(b) (2007) (noting the interest of families in "privately and peacefully
mourning"); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7517(a)(2) (West Supp. 2008) (noting individuals'

interest in mourning privately and in peace).
139. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
140. Scholars disagree, for example, regarding whether activity amounts to intrusion.
Some argue that intrusive noises, odors, or communications into one's private realm
threaten privacy. See, e.g., Van Den Haag, supra note 128, at 153. Others disagree,
arguing that this broad definition encompasses little more than nuisance activities. See
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 439 (1980); Judith Jarvis
Thompson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 310 (1975).
141. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Productions Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489 (Cal. 1998) ("Of

the four privacy torts identified by Prosser, the tort of intrusion into private places,
conversations or matter is perhaps the one that best captures the common understanding
of an 'invasion of privacy.' ").
142. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 n.24 (2000) (noting that the common

law privacy right appears in the Court's constitutional cases as an "interest"). Other
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the intrusion branch
of privacy as "intentionally intrud[ing], physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns
... [when] the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable

person."' 4 3 Three requirements thus emerge: (1) an intrusion, (2)
into a secluded space or one's private affairs, (3) in an objectively
offensive manner. Protection against intrusion is at its zenith in the
home or other spatially bounded area.' 44 However, courts have
recognized "relative" zones of privacy in public spaces in
circumstances where individuals can credibly claim a reasonable
expectation that certain persons should be excluded. 145 The purpose

of protecting against intrusion in either situation is the same-to
provide a place of refuge for necessary
emotional release and an
46
escape from pressures of daily life.1
observers also note the relationship between privacy interests in free speech cases and the
intrusion tort. See infra notes 164-66.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 16, § 652B. The Restatement
adopts Professor Prosser's influential framework, see Prosser, supra note 23, at 389, which
has come to dominate tort law. See MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 1:24, at 41 (noting that
Prosser's framework and the Restatement are "accepted by nearly all courts").
144. The Restatement, for example, notes that the "defendant is subject to liability...
only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private
seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 16, § 652B, cmt. c (1997); see also MCCARTHY, supra
note 23, § 5:89, at 626 (noting that a "physical invasion of one's home is a classic example
of a violation of privacy by intrusion"). Other areas of law similarly limit intrusion to
spatially-bounded areas. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 15, at 496-97 (discussing
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence limiting protection against government
surveillance to private spaces).
145. See, e.g., Sanders v. American Broadcasting Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 68 (Cal. 1999).
Here the court found that undercover reporters violated a person's privacy by recording a
conversation at work, although the conversation could reasonably have been overheard by
others. Id. The court recognized that "degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our
expectations of privacy" exist and that privacy "is not a binary, all-or-nothing
characteristic." Id. at 72. Rather, the court found "the concept of 'seclusion' is relative."
Id.; see also Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. American Broadcasting Cos., 306 F.3d 806,
812-13 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the "invasion of privacy" includes "the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion" when such intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable person);
Danai v. Canal Square Assoc., 862 A.2d 395, 400-01 (D.C. 2004) (finding privacy requires
an expectation of privacy created in a place where a person has secluded himself, which is
in turn recognized by society as reasonable); Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, T 79, 130 P.3d
325, 339 (Utah 2005) (stating that existence of an "actionable privacy interest" depends on
the "expectation of a reasonable person"); MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 5:98 at 660-63
(describing cases).
146. See WESTIN, supra note 131, at 35 (describing private space as important for
emotional release and as providing a "respite from emotional stimulation"); Arnold
Simmel, Privacy Is Not an Isolated Freedom, in PRIVACY, supra note 128, at 71, 73-74
(private space allows us to develop "a firmer, better constructed, more integrated position
in opposition to dominant social pressures"); David L. Bazelon, Probing Privacy, 12
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At first glance, funeral protest statutes superficially track this
definition. As discussed more fully below, however, the privacy
interest underlying these statutes substantially departs from the
common law. That interest is neither limited to a truly secluded area
nor requires the sort of physical or harassing invasion that the
common law deems necessary for an invasion of privacy. As a result,
these statutes actually protect a civility-based privacy interest that
encompasses freedom from disrespectful and offensive expression.
Defining the privacy interest in this manner poses significant
problems from a First Amendment perspective.
Much of the Court's doctrine attempts to ensure that government
regulators do not unduly restrict speech simply because it angers or
147
upsets the audience. As the Court noted in Terminiello v. Chicago:
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society
depends on free discussion ....
Accordingly a function of free
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea. 48
Of course, speech that upsets or angers may also cause violence or
cross the line into the harassment required for common law invasion
of privacy claims, but it does not always do so. Sometimes speech
merely angers or offends people. While regulation of harassment is
justified, restricting speech merely because it angers or offends
discriminates against unpopular messages.
Such discrimination
"lead[s] to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or
dominant political or community groups"'49 and interferes with
democratic deliberation and open discussion. 5 '
GONZAGA L. REV. 587, 589-91 (1997) (listing various individual attributes associated with
the ability to carve out private space); Prosser, supra note 23, at 392 (noting that the
intrusion tort is designed primarily to protect mental peace of mind); Solove, Taxonomy,
supra note 15, at 554-55 (stating that privacy allows people "to rest from the pressures of
living in public and performing public roles .... Without refuge from others, relationships
can become more bitter and tense").
147. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
148. Id. at 4; see also Forsyth v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992)

(noting that speech cannot be punished or banned "simply because it might offend a
hostile mob").
149. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4-5; see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.

46, 55 (1988) (finding that "outrageousness" standard for punishing speech "in the area of

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Unfortunately, it has not always been clear whether officials
regulate because speech is offensive or because it is likely to involve
violence or harassment. Accordingly, the Court has attempted to
establish clear guidelines regarding when speech can be punished and
when, although offensive, it is protected. As noted above, the Court
narrowly defines its categories of low-value speech to restrict only
speech without expressive content.'
Similarly, its time, place, and
manner requirements pertaining to content-neutral regulations try to
leave officials with little discretion to discriminate against speech.'52
In both instances, the Court sets forth objective guidelines in an effort
to avoid government regulation based on communicative impact.
The remainder of this part discusses the three aspects of the
common law intrusion tort-seclusion, intrusion, and offense-and
demonstrates that "offense" is the only real aspect of the intrusion
tort present in the funeral protest statute. This part also discusses the
First Amendment implications of regulating offensive speech under
the guise of protecting privacy.

political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a
jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of
their dislike of a particular expression").
150. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 ("[I]t is only through free debate and free exchange
of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change
is effected."); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (stating that free
exchange of ideas is intended to "remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion.., in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests").
151. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text; Wells, supra note 59, at 178-86
(discussing Court's attempts to craft narrow categories of low-value speech).
152. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 130-31 ("A government regulation that allows
arbitrary application is 'inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner
regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing
a particular point of view.' "); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969)
(" '[Tihe peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent
upon the uncontrolled will of an official-as by requiring a permit or license which may be
granted or withheld in the discretion of such official-is an unconstitutional censorship.'
(quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958))).
Although the Court's time, place, and manner requirements aim to control
governmental discretion, its doctrine has not been entirely successful in this area.
Commentators have criticized the Court's time, place, and manner analysis as being too
vague and malleable to prevent censorship. See David Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in
Public Forum Cases: Misplaced Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFF. L.
REV. 175, 178 (1983); cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of
Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1259-65 (2008) (criticizing Court's application of
intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral statutes, making governmental regulation of
disfavored speech less difficult). Nevertheless, the Court's doctrine has control of
unreasonable discretion as its aim.
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1. Seclusion

On one level, statutes regulating peaceful funeral protests fit
comfortably within the common law's definition of intrusion. An
intimate and emotional gathering of individuals for the specific
purpose of honoring the dead is just the sort of public event where
one expects a relative zone of privacy from unwanted and offensive
visitors.153 If the laws were written simply to prevent intrusion into
such intimate gatherings, there would be little argument regarding the
privacy interest underlying them. But the sheer size of the statutory
bubble zones creates difficulties in this regard.
Many statutes create bubble zones of 300 to 1,000 feet around
funeral ceremonies.1 4 Thus, the statutes exclude protestors not only
from the immediate area surrounding the funeral services, but also
from a large zone (the equivalent of one to three football fields in
length) beyond them. Furthermore, many statutes include within
their privacy protections funeral processions, which move through
various urban or rural areas. 55 Certainly, funeral goers have a right
to exclude unwanted visitors from the procession vehicles or the
procession itself (i.e., the procession is a relative zone of privacy). It
is unreasonable, however, to expect a zone of solitude extending 300
to 1,000 feet beyond a mobile procession.
The bubble zones' size and their regulation of activity in public
space casts doubt on the "seclusion" they seek to protect. When
homes or other buildings are involved, a common understanding of
what is to be protected from invasion exists: the actual physical
space. Funeral ceremonies that occur within such spatially-bounded
places are classic areas of seclusion. The Supreme Court's free
speech doctrine has, in fact, recognized the importance of spatiallybounded areas to privacy interests.'5 6 By extending well beyond these
spatially-bounded places, however, the statutory bubble zones
regulate public areas from which people freely come and go. Similar
issues arise with ceremonies that occur outdoors. Recognition of a
153. WESTIN, supra note 131, at 36 ("[E]motional release through privacy plays an
important part in individual life at times of loss, shock, or sorrow. In such moments
society provides comfort both through communal support by gatherings of friends and
through respect for the privacy of the individual and his intimates.").
154. See supranotes 107-10 and accompanying text.
155. See supranote 116 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-71 (1994)
(concerning a medical clinic); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-88 (1988) (concerning
the home); cf. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (recognizing a right of
privacy in the home, but invalidating an ordinance that would punish handing leaflets from

door-to-door). For further discussion of these cases, see infra Part III.B.
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privacy interest there involves recognition of a relative zone of
privacy, the borders of which are difficult to discern.
One cannot simply carve out a space in public and call it a
relative zone of privacy. Such zones are determined by context,
based on "social custom and usage" rather than objective factors such
as "time, place and public forum.' 15 7 Compounding this problem is
our nature as social creatures. Whether our day is spent largely at
work or running errands, we simply cannot avoid being in public for
significant amounts of time-time in which we have little expectation
of being able to exclude others from any zone of privacy. 58 Thus,

recognizing relative zones of privacy involves a delicate balance of
preserving social interaction while carving out necessary spaces of
refuge in public. 5 '

To the extent that social custom recognizes the importance of an
intimate gathering for mourning purposes, 6 ° it seems uncontroversial
to recognize a relative zone of seclusion around the immediate areas
involving such ceremonies, whether inside or out. Much of the
Court's free speech jurisprudence supports this contention. Thus, the
Court has recognized the right of individuals to associate with one
another for expressive purposes, which includes a right to exclude
unwanted expression.' 6' Furthermore, the Court's doctrine allows

private property owners to exclude unwanted expression from their
property.'62

It similarly allows the government to exclude such

expression from areas that are not considered public fora, i.e.,
163
government property traditionally open to expression.
157. MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 5:98, at 662; see also Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81,
79, 130 P.3d 325, 341. ("[W]hether a person is entitled to solitude of seclusion is a
relative and highly fact-dependent matter.").
158. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)
(refusing to find intrusion where a news cameraman filmed events following a traffic
accident on a public highway); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON

TORTS 855 (5th ed. 1984) ("On the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff
has no legal right to be alone and it is no invasion of his privacy to do more than follow
him about and watch him there."); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 5:97, at 654-60
(collecting cases finding no invasion of privacy while in a public place).
159. HARPER ET AL., 2 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 9.6, at 752 (3d ed. 2006)

("The extent to which seclusion can be protected is severely limited by the protection that
must often be accorded to the freedom of action and expression of those who threaten
that seclusion of others.").
160. See supranote 157 and accompanying text.
161. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000); Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995).
162. Hudgens v. NLRB., 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976).
163. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(discussing categories of fora into which government property falls). Courts have found
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Accordingly, recognizing a relative zone of seclusion in the area in
and immediately around a funeral ceremony-whether held on
private or public property-is perfectly reasonable.
Bubble zones of 300 to 1,000 feet, however, turn the notion of
seclusion on its head. It is not clear that zones of such breadth are
necessary to protect the seclusion associated with mourning a loved
one. These zones encompass a great deal of public space, including
streets and sidewalks, space that is simultaneously used by others
unassociated with a funeral ceremony. Funeral processions, which
travel through areas continuously used for other purposes, present
the issue more starkly. Surely mourners cannot suspend others' daily
routines to preserve a relative zone of seclusion. They similarly
cannot prevent peaceful protests in large areas under the guise of
creating a zone of seclusion.
2. Intrusion
To some extent, of course, the nature of the intrusion may affect
the area of relative seclusion. Perhaps peaceful funeral protests are
so intrusive that large bubble zones are necessary to protect
mourners' seclusion. Certainly, the statutes seem to contemplate
them as an especially egregious form of invasion. Nevertheless,
peaceful funeral protests do not fit comfortably within the common
law conception of intrusion.
Tort law envisions intrusion as requiring physical, aural, or
harassing invasions. Thus, the Restatement notes that an invasion of
privacy may occur "by physical intrusion into a place in which the
plaintiff has secluded himself" or "by the use of the defendant's
senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the
plaintiff's private affairs. ' ' 6" Courts have also recognized that
persistent harassment of another person while in public constitutes an
intrusion.16 1
Most actionable intrusion claims have involved

public cemeteries to be non-public fora. Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d
1309, 1322-24 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that national cemeteries are nonpublic fora, and
thus subject to greater regulation).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 16, § 652B cmt. b.
165. See, e.g., Summers v. Bailey, 55 F.3d 1564, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding that

allegations of harassment, stalking, and intimidation stated a claim of intrusion); Wolfson
v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1420 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Conduct that amounts to a persistent

course of hounding, harassment and unreasonable surveillance, even if conducted in a
public or semi-public place, may nevertheless rise to the level of invasion of privacy based
upon seclusion.").
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unwanted spying, surveillance, eavesdropping, invasions of one's
home, bodily searches, and the like. 66
While it is reasonable to view noisy, disruptive, and harassing
protests as invasive,"' peaceful protest laws restrict all protests

regardless of whether they are noisy or disruptive. They prohibit
activities such as a small group of people or a lone protestor quietly
holding signs or distributing leaflets near a church or cemetery.'68
Such protestors neither physically nor aurally invade a funeral
ceremony; nor do their protests amount to the harassing behavior
required to constitute an "invasion" at common law. Peaceful
protests, therefore, are not an intrusion when they are conducted
immediately outside of the church or cemetery, much less if
protestors stand 500 feet away.
One could argue that the very presence of protestors intrudes
upon mourners' peace of mind, inhibiting the service and the grieving
process. But peaceful protestors, although concededly offensive to
others, do not constitute an intrusion for purposes of privacy law.
The common law has been reluctant to recognize psychological
invasion as a legally cognizable intrusion. 169 Professor Prosser's
influential article noted that "bad manners, harsh names and insulting
gestures in public, have not been held to be enough" to satisfy a claim
for intrusion. 7 °
In free speech doctrine, the Court has been similarly reluctant to
restrict protestors in public spaces simply because they offend others.
Thus, it has said that "[l]eafletting and commenting on matters of
public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the
First Amendment, and speech in public areas is at its most protected
on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a traditional public
166. MCCARTHY, supra note 23, §§ 5:90-5:105 (discussing various forms of intrusion in
case law).
167. The common law definition of intrusion does not encompass mere noise. See
Prosser, supra note 23, at 390. Nevertheless, scholars debate whether noise should amount
to intrusion, see supra notes 128, 133, and the Court recognizes noise disturbances as an
aspect of the privacy interest in its free speech doctrine. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 86-89 (1949). Accordingly, it is legitimate to view noisy interruptions of an
intimate gathering as a potential intrusion in the funeral protest context, especially given
mourners' right to exclude others from the immediate circumstances of the ceremony. See
supra note 60. Whether existing laws are tailored to noisy intrusions so that one can say
they (1) protect mourners' zone of seclusion, and (2) are consistent with the First
Amendment, are different matters.
168. Pennsylvania makes clear, for example, that the simple act of distributing a leaflet
is a restricted activity. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
169. MCCARTHY, supra note 23, § 5:89, at 625.
170. Prosser, supra note 23, at 390.

2008]

PRIVACY AND FUNERAL PROTESTS

forum."'' Such protection extends to offensive speech because " 'in
public debate ... citizens must tolerate insulting, and even
outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.' ",172 The breadth of
the statutory bubble zones and the statutes' application to peaceful
protests seemingly runs afoul of the Court's cases condemning
regulation of speech simply because it is offensive.
Nevertheless, statutes restricting peaceful protests openly tout
their regulation of protests that offend the audience. Some statutes
'
refer to peaceful protests at funerals as "exploitive" 173
or "shocking to
74
the conscience."' Others describe such protests as lacking "respect"
for mourners and the dignity of the grieving process. 175 Several
176
statutes refer to the emotional harm caused by funeral protests.
Tennessee prohibits "interfering with a funeral" by "utterance[s],
gesture[s], or display[s] in a manner offensive to the sensibilities of an
ordinary person" and then defines funeral protests as per se
"offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinary person. ' 1 17
In effect, peaceful protest statutes conflate the common law's
second requirement, intrusion, with its third requirement, that the
intrusion be offensive to a reasonable person. One could argue, of
171. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997); see also
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (invalidating statute limiting display of signs in
public because "public streets and sidewalks [are] traditional public fora").
172. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at
322); see also Schenck, 510 U.S. at 383 (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 322).
173. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015(b)(1) (2007) (describing protestors' behavior
as "public exploitation").
174. Right to Grieve in Privacy Act, 2007 Mont. Laws 13, 14 (describing protestors'
"exploitation of another's grief" as "shocking to the conscience") (codified at MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-8-116 (2007)).

175. Kansas's statute states that "[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring
and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord
to the deceased person who was once their own." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015(b)(1)
(2007). Pennsylvania officials argued that their statute was necessary to allow families to
"remember fallen soldiers with 'honor, dignity, and respect.' " Kathleen Haughney,
Rendell Signs Law Prohibiting Groups Protesting at Funerals, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, July 1, 2006, at B5, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06182/70266685.stm (quoting Pennsylvania Governor Rendell); see also Mosher, supra note 45, at 601
n.104 (" 'The [funeral protest legislation] ... protects really a sacred right ... for the

family to grieve and put their loved ones to rest in a dignified manner.' " (quoting S. 94-97,
Reg. Sess., at 33 (I11.2006) (statement by Senator Winkel))); Witt, supra note 7 (quoting
Michigan Representative Michael Rogers as saying that legislation restricting funeral
protests was necessary to allow "families [to] grieve peaceably and [to] give them
dignity").
176. See, e.g., supra note 121 and accompanying text.
177. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-17-317(a) (West 2007).
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course, that the statute's references to "offense" and "shock to the
conscience" merely reflect the common law's third requirement.
After all, one expects to see references to "offense" in a statute
tracking common law privacy requirements.
Peaceful protest
statutes, however, do not protect against physically invasive or
harassing protests because reasonable people find them offensive.
Rather, they characterize otherwise peaceful protests as offensive
and, therefore, invasive. In other words, offensiveness is no longer an
independent variable that must exist in addition to an invasion.
Funeral protest statutes determine that protests are invasive because
they offend the audience.
Unpacking the privacy interest in this way reveals that the
statutes do not equate that interest with freedom from intrusion.
Rather, the privacy interest underlying peaceful protest statutes
protects the dignity of the funeral ceremony and those attending it
from disrespectful actions.
3. Privacy as Protection of Dignity and Civility
What does it mean to say that peaceful protest statutes equate
privacy with protection of dignity? Like the terms "privacy" and
"intrusion," the term "dignity" is susceptible to many meanings.178
The most common conceptions, however, find their way back to
Immanuel Kant, who referred to the dignity of individuals as the
capacity of persons to make and act on their own decisions.179 As

rational beings who are ends in ourselves, we are all entitled to
respect from others. 8 ' Offensive breaches of social norms, 8' like
those that funeral protest statutes contemplate, arguably disrespect
mourners, the sanctity of the funeral ceremony, and the core of our
dignity.
For this reason, protection of dignity has been an important
aspect of privacy torts.'82 As Professor Edward Bloustein noted, "the

178. See Guy E. Carmi, Dignity-The Enemy From Within:

A Theoretical and

Comparative Analysis of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification,9 U. PA. J. CONST.

L. 957, 983 (2007).
179. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 44-47

(Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1959).
180. See id. at 46.
181. A dignity assault in this sense results from an offensive breach of social norms.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "offense" as a "breach of law, rules, duty,
propriety, or etiquette." THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 724 (2d ed. 1989).
182. Invasion of privacy is one of many "dignitary" torts, like assault, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, that recognize the harm of
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gist of the wrong in intrusion cases is ... a blow to human dignity, an
assault on human personality. Eavesdropping and wiretapping,
unwanted entry into another's home, ... are wrongful because they
'
are demeaning of individuality."183
Professor Robert Post has also
noted:
[The intrusion tort] safeguards the rules of civility that in some
significant measure constitute both individuals and community
.... [An] interest arises from the dignitary harm which
plaintiffs suffer as a result of having been treated
disrespectfully. Violations of civility rules are intrinsically
demeaning ... because dignitary harm does not depend on the
psychological condition of an individual plaintiff, but rather on
the forms of respect that a plaintiff is entitled to receive from
others. 184
Statutes regulating peaceful funeral protests, however, approach
dignity differently from the common law. Professors Bloustein and
Post identify the purpose behind the privacy torts, i.e., that they
protect against offensive invasions into seclusion in order to protect
human dignity. 1 5 Statutes regulating peaceful funeral protests, on the
other hand, protect an individual's dignity from offense regardless of
86
whether there has been a physical, aural or harassing invasion.
Without such an invasion, funeral protest statutes effectively protect
dignity qua dignity. In this sense:
[Equating privacy with dignity] ground[s] privacy in social
forms of respect that we owe each other as members of a
common community. So understood, privacy presupposes
persons who are socially embedded, whose identity and selfworth depend upon the performance of social norms, the
violation of which constitutes "intrinsic" injury .... If privacy
is conceived as a form of dignity, it presupposes a particular
kind of social structure in which persons are joined by
common norms that govern the forms of their social

the tort often stems from having suffered certain indignities rather than physical injury. 2
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.3(1), at 302-03 (2d ed. 1993).

183. Bloustein, supra note 133, at 974.
184. Post, supra note 133, at 959-67.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
186. See. e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1380 (2007) (prohibiting pickets within 500 feet and
one hour before and after a funeral).
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interactions.187 These norms constitute the decencies of
civilization.

Even more specifically, funeral protest laws, by protecting
dignity for dignity's sake, are more focused on enforcing proper
188
manners, i.e., preventing breaches of etiquette and social norms,
than in grounding dignity in true respect for individuals. While both
are aspects of civility associated with dignity, the distinction is an
important one. As James Whitman has written, civility rules that
require an outward showing of respect are different from rules that
require a sincere acknowledgement of the humanity of others.189 The

latter rules "aim[] to create or affirm a deeper dignitary structure for
society at large," such as antidiscrimination laws, while the former
rules "aim[] to create or affirm a ritual relationship of respect
between two individuals.""19

Peaceful funeral protest laws do not

require protestors sincerely to acknowledge the humanity of
mourners. Rather, they protect mourners from seeing or hearing
protestors. Thus, they attempt to enforce an outward showing of
respect toward mourners and the funeral ceremony.
More importantly, although privacy and free speech law in the
United States embrace notions of human dignity, they do not
recognize a concept of dignity that requires an outward showing of
respect enforced through law.19' Some European countries, especially
187. Post, supra note 22, at 2092-93. Professor Post does not argue for a privacy right
untethered from common law requirements. See id. But his explanation of the dignity
rationale underlying the common law tort is generally useful to understanding the
relationship between privacy, dignity and civility.
188. See James 0. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE
L.J. 1279, 1289 (2000).
189. Id. at 1290-92.
190. Id. at 1291. Sociologist Erving Goffman also noted the distinction between
substantive rules, "which govern[] ... law, morality, and ethics," and ceremonial rules and
expressions, which are "incorporated in what we call etiquette." ERVING GOFFMAN, The
Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACTION RITUAL 47, 55 (1967).

191. Steven Heyman's thoughtful book, Free Speech & Human Dignity, explores the
manner in which free speech law embraces the concept of dignity. STEVEN J. HEYMAN,
FREE SPEECH & HUMAN DIGNITY (2008). Professor Heyman argues that "rights... flow

from the respect for human dignity." Id. at 39. Building on Kantian notions of dignity, he
argues that every person has intrinsic worth which "allows him to 'exact[] respect for
himself from all other rational beings in the world.' " Id. (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 186 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). This

aspect of Professor Heyman's argument is, in my mind, uncontroversial. See Wells, supra
note 59, at 165-66.
Heyman's argument that the "duty of respect applies both in the moral and in the
legal realm, where it takes the form of an obligation to respect the legal rights of others,"
HEYMAN, supra, at 39, is somewhat more difficult to defend. Kant's statements that
contemptuous actions deny others the dignity they are due came in the context of his

2008]

PRIVACY AND FUNERAL PROTESTS

Germany, recognize such privacy rights. Germany has a welldeveloped jurisprudence allowing punishment based upon insults to
honor."9 Its privacy law is also rooted in a desire to preserve honor
and personal respect. 93 In both cases, the law enforces the rituals
through which people interact.194
The United States, however, has resisted recognizing such a
privacy right. As noted above, "bad manners, harsh names and
insulting gestures in public," although disrespectful and offensive, do
not amount to an invasion of privacy. 95 Even intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the tort most likely to punish a pure dignity
infraction, 96 does not equate dignity with forced outward showings of

discussion of moral obligations. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
209 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). My writings elsewhere suggest
that translating those moral obligations into legal obligations-especially when an
individual's rights have been invaded by another individual (rather than the state)involves a more finely drawn process than the balancing of rights that Professor Heyman
advocates. See Wells, supra note 59, at 169-70. Thus, to find a dignity interest invaded
requires a finding that speech is so coercive that it attempts to override our thought
processes-as, for example, with the Court's categories of low-value speech. Id. at 177-86.
Rudeness does not suffice. Id. at 169-70, 177-86; see also Whitman, supra note 188, at
1380 ("The Supreme Court has ... come close to saying that it is unconstitutional to make
rudeness actionable.").
192. Id. at 1295-1332. German law allows punishment for attacks on honor that show
disrespect or lack of respect. Such insults can include calling another person an asshole,
an idiot, or a whore. Id. at 1305 n.70.
193. Whitman, supra note 15, at 1164-71.
194. Many scholars trace Germany's focus on dignity back to Kant, whose writings are
enormously influential. See KANT, supra note 179, at 44-47; KANT, supra note 191, at 186.
Given Kant's work, one might think that the concept of dignity underlying German law
involves the sincere acknowledgement of humans' intrinsic worth. Professor Whitman
notes, however, that Kant had less influence on the German law of insult than is supposed.
Rather than involving the sincere acknowledgement of another's innate humanity:
The roots of honor and respect lie in some coarse and unflattering aspects of
human psychology .... [W]e have a strong instinct to think of honor as
differential, to think that if I am entitled to respect it is because I am better than
others. This instinct is so strong that forms of civility tend to have, at their heart,
some vision of hierarchical superiority; and societies that are "respectful" societies
will be, almost inevitably, societies in which the cultural traditions of social
hierarchy are strong.
Whitman, supra note 188, at 1331.
195. See PROSSER, supra note 23.
196. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 159, § 9.6, at 755 n.15. Although the tort has
several requirements, scholars have noted that it effectively boils down to punishing
outrageous conduct that offends our dignity. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 42-43 (1982); see also Robert
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 622 (1990) ("[T]he
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respect. 19 7 In the free speech realm, the Court has refused to
recognize a similar dignity interest. Accordingly, in Boos v. Barry,198
the Court found unconstitutional a law prohibiting the display of signs
within 500 feet of an embassy that tended to bring foreign
'
governments into "public odium or public disrepute."199
The Court
found the interest underlying the law-a desire to protect the dignity
of foreign diplomats by shielding them from critical speechinsufficiently neutral.2"
Such an interest was "so inherently
subjective" as to run afoul of the Court's " 'longstanding refusal to
[punish speech] because [it] may have an adverse emotional impact
on the audience.' "201
If much of U.S. law rejects a conception of privacy that amounts
to an enforced show of respect, how have funeral protest laws come
to embrace it? To some extent, the fault lies with the Supreme
Court's free speech jurisprudence, which has failed to define
adequately the privacy interests it balances against free speech
rights. 2 If anything, the Court's careless use of the term "privacy"
and its tendency to equate that term with the existence of a "captive
audience" has led legislatures to their current conception of privacy.

The next part examines the Court's cases involving privacy interests.
It begins with a discussion of foundational cases and culminates in a

tort, despite its apparent abundance of elements, in practice tends to reduce to a single
element-the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct.").
197. See, e.g., HARPER ET AL., supra note 159, § 9.2, at 725 (noting that, absent some
sort of prior relationship, even abusive speech is generally not actionable because
"[o]rdinary irritations, indignities, and unpleasant experiences must be born as a price of
living in society where a nice consideration by everyone of everybody else's feelings can
hardly be expected"); KEETON ET AL., supra note 158, at 59 ("Our manners, and with
them our law, have not yet progressed to the point where we are able to afford a remedy
...
for all intended mental disturbance ....
The plaintiff must necessarily be expected and
required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to acts that are
definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is still, in this country at least, such a thing as
liberty to express unflattering opinion of another, however wounding it may be to the
other's feelings ...").
198. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
199. Id. at 315.
200. Id. at 322.
201. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)).
202. See Gormley, supra note 130, at 1376 ("[Tlhe precise parameters of this 'right to
be let alone' [in the Court's free speech jurisprudence] are anything but self-evident.");
Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken to?, 67 NW. U.
L. REV. 153, 158 (1972) (describing the Court's doctrine as "a morass of inconsistent and
often unjust ad hoc resolutions"); Strauss, supra note 134, at 106 (characterizing the
Supreme Court's analysis of the privacy interest as "woefully lacking").
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discussion of Hill v. Colorado, °3 the most recent decision confronting

the privacy rationale in the context of protestors.
III. PRIVACY AS AN INTEREST IN THE SUPREME COURT'S FREE
SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE

Privacy has played a role in the Supreme Court's free speech

doctrine since the 1940s.2 4 From the beginning, the Court's
jurisprudence has characterized the privacy interest as protecting
against unwanted intrusions.0 5 Unfortunately, the Court's individual
cases do not clearly identify when speech is an intrusion for privacy
purposes. One can, however, glean some enduring principles from
the Court's cases if one carefully reads them.
A.

FoundationalCases

1. Privacy in the Home
As with the intrusion tort, the Court's recognition of privacy
interests began in the home. In Martin v. City of Struthers,"6 although
the Court struck down a city ordinance forbidding persons
distributing literature from knocking or summoning occupants to the

door,2 °7 it acknowledged that the law legitimately aimed at protecting
"householders from annoyance, including intrusion upon the hours of

rest., 208 Nevertheless, because narrower regulations were possible
203. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
204. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 558-61 (1970)
(discussing early Supreme Court cases involving conflicts between privacy rights and free
speech).
205. Several scholars have noted that the Court's privacy interest relies on the notion
of intrusion. See id. at 558-61 (discussing free speech cases under heading of "intrusion on
seclusion"); O'BRIEN, supra note 127, at 150 (1979) (noting resemblance between free
speech cases and the Fourth Amendment intrusion rationale); Bostwick, supra note 134, at
1451-56 (describing the Court's early free speech cases as involving privacy of "repose");
Haiman, supra note 202, at 157 (noting the similarity between the tort of intrusion and the
right "not to be spoken to" asserted in free speech cases).
206. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
207. Id. at 142.
208. Id. at 144. All the Justices acknowledged the potential privacy interest in
regulating speech. Justice Murphy commented that "few, if any, believe more strongly in
the maxim, 'a man's home is his castle,' than I," although he agreed with the majority that
free speech rights outweighed the interest in Martin. Id. at 150 (Murphy, J., concurring).
Justice Frankfurter lamented the "lack of privacy and hazards to peace of mind and body"
that were increasing realities of crowded urban life and argued that the privacy of the
home outweighed the leafletters free speech rights. Id. at 152-53 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 154-57 (Reed, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "assurance of
privacy" in the home should overcome speakers' rights).
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and the means of communication was so important, the Court struck
down the ordinance.0 9
21 ° the
Several years later in Kovacs v. Cooper,
Court made clear
that privacy interests justified regulating speech, this time upholding a
regulation banning trucks emitting "loud and raucous noises. "211
Kovacs distinguished Martin as involving a home owner who "could
protect himself from such intrusion by an appropriate sign., 211 In
contrast, those subjected to noisy sound trucks were "unwilling
listeners." Such persons were "not like the passer-by who may be
offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. In his
home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape this
interference with his privacy by loud speakers except through the
213
protection of the municipality."
Kovacs and Martin are notable for several reasons. First, the
214
Court did not find privacy interests in the home to be absolute.
One's home might be one's castle, 2 ' but individuals, if able to protect
their own privacy, must do so before a state may enact laws restricting
intrusive speech.216
Second, Kovacs alluded to the "captive
audience," which is the idea that individuals or groups sometimes
cannot escape intrusive speech.217 Linking privacy with captivity,
whether necessary or not, later became a hallmark of the Court's
jurisprudence. 218 Finally, Kovacs' reference to a captive audience did
not clearly limit that concept to the home. Rather, it intimated that

209. Id. at 147-49.
210. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
211. Id. at 79.
212. Id. at 86.
213. Id. at 87. Justice Frankfurter again observed "the steadily narrowing opportunities
for serenity and reflection" in daily life. Id. at 97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "Without
such opportunities," Justice Frankfurter concluded, "freedom of thought becomes a
mocking phrase, and without freedom of thought there can be no free society." Id.
214. Id. at 86-87; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1943).
215. This notion has long roots in Anglo-American legal history. See Semayne's Case,
77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603) ("[T]he house of everyone is to him as his.., castle and
fortress, as well for his defense against injury and violence as for his repose."); see also
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (acknowledging the "sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life"). Free speech scholars embrace it as well. See
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 407 (1948) ("Freedom of
the home is as important as freedom of speech."); Alfred Kamin, Residential Picketing and
the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 177, 182 (1966) ("[T]he quiet enjoyment and
privacy of residential premises... merits a higher priority than freedom of speech ... .
216. See Martin, 319 U.S. at 147-48.
217. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 86-87.
218. See generally Strauss, supra note 134 (discussing the Court's captive audience
doctrine).
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individuals could be captive to noise while on a public street.219
Accordingly, Martin and Kovacs adopted a privacy interest that
resembled the intrusion tort, but with decidedly rough and ill-defined
edges.
Rowan v. United States Post Office, 22 ° built on-but also
confused-this existing doctrine. Rowan involved a federal statute
allowing individuals to identify erotic material they did not want to
receive through the mail.22' Congress enacted the statute "to protect
minors and the privacy of homes from such material and to place the
judgment of what constitutes an offensive invasion of those interests
in the hands of the addressee., 222 Noting that a large portion of
modern mailings were unsolicited, unwanted and often offensive,223
the Court upheld the statute, stating:
Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any
unwanted communication .... We therefore categorically
reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the
Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the
home of another ....[N]o one has a right to press even "good"
ideas on an unwilling recipient. That we are often "captive,"
outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech and other sound does not mean we must be captive,
everywhere.224
Analogizing to Martin, the Court found the ban a reasonable burden
on free speech rights because the statute placed the decision to halt
mailings in the hands of the homeowner.
Rowan relied on substantially different notions of intrusion and
captive audience than previous cases. To be sure, Rowan and Martin
initially placed the decision to protect privacy with occupants in the
home. In Martin, the Court carefully balanced the nature of the
intrusion against the burden on free speech rights. In Rowan,
however, the Court never analyzed the allegedly intrusive nature of

219. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87 (noting sound trucks interfere with a listener's privacy "[i]n
his home or on the street" and, that on residential city streets, "the quiet and tranquility so
desirable for city dwellers would ... be at the mercy of advocates of particular religious,
social or political persuasions").
220. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
221. Id. at 729-30.
222. Id. at 732.
223. Id. at 736.
224. Id. at 737-38 (citing Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)).
225. Id. at 736-37.
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unwanted mailings.226 Rather, it presumed that individuals in the
22 7
home were captive and entitled to freedom from unwanted speech.
This presumption affected Rowan's treatment of the captive audience
issue.2" Kovacs viewed people as captive because they lacked control
over unwanted incursions (i.e. aural invasions).229 By presuming
captivity in the home, invasion was never an issue in Rowan.
Furthermore, the federal law regulated erotic speech because of its
offensive content. Rowan's designation of speech as "unwanted"
because of its content rather than its physical invasiveness was also a
departure from Martin and Kovacs.
2 3 ° the Court
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,
extended Rowan's

captive audience rationale. Upholding the FCC's ban on indecent
communications as applied to a broadcast of George Carlin's "Seven
Dirty Words," the Court noted the increasing presence of "indecent
material presented over the airwaves," which confronts citizens "in
the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone
plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder."23' 1 In

effect, the Court reasoned that the audience was captive to intrusive
and indecent broadcasts because saying "that one may avoid further
offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is
like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow."232

Like Rowan, Pacifica presumed captivity in the home. Although

Justice Stevens characterized the broadcast of indecent material as
invasive, he never explained why home occupants could not turn off
the radio to avoid the intrusion.233 Rather, like the Rowan Court, he

assumed that one should not have to endure such "assaults" while in
the home.234 Pacifica solidified the idea that unwanted speech can be
226. At least one commentator has noted that the intrusion in Rowan was minimal at
best: "[The act of throwing away unwanted mail ...[is] such a simple operation that it is
difficult to understand the necessity for any further restrictions." Haiman, supra note 202,
at 180.
227. See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738.
228. See id.
229. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949).
230. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
231. Id. at 748.
232. Id. at 748-49.
233. See id. at 766 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (noting that an offended listener can
"simply extend his arm and switch stations or flick the 'off button' ").
234. Furthermore, unlike Rowan, Pacifica allowed regulation absent an individual's
indication of actual offense, effectively prohibiting even willing audiences from hearing
speech. See Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment: A Revisionist
View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 757 (1980); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L. A. Powe, Jr., Televised
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a function of content (i.e., communicative impact) rather than
invasiveness, although the Court did note that government officials
could not regulate speech in public merely because society found the
idea offensive.23 5
The Court's decisions through Pacifica thus leave us with a
confused doctrine regarding privacy interests in the home. Although
the Court began with a narrow approach equating intrusion with
uncontrollable invasions and making captivity a function of intrusion
and space, later cases appear to presume captivity in the home and
expand the notion of intrusion to include speech with offensive
content. Over time, the Court has relied on both visions to accept or
reject privacy interests,236 thus creating further uncertainty about that
interest.
2. Privacy in Public
The Court has been less willing to recognize privacy interests or
captive audiences in public spaces than in the home. Indeed, it has
often stated that in public "the burden normally falls upon the viewer
to 'avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting
[his] eyes.' ,237 Nevertheless, the captive audience doctrine eventually
found its way into cases even when the home was not involved.
As early as the 1950s the Court rejected an argument that transit
car passengers were captive to radio programs played by car owners.
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,3 s the Court dismissed
Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123,
1231 (1978); Strauss, supra note 134, at 93.
235. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745 ("[Tjhe fact that society may find the speech offensive is

not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives
offense, that consequence is reason for according it constitutional protection.").
236. In Bolger v. Youngs Drugs, 463 U.S. 60 (1983), for example, the Court rejected the

argument that privacy interests justified a statute prohibiting mailing unsolicited
contraceptive advertisements to the home. According to the Court, recipients in the home
were not captive to such speech since they could simply throw the advertisements away.

Id. at 72. The Court distinguished Rowan as involving a statute allowing a homeowner to
request his mail be stopped. Id. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530 (1980), the Court used similar reasoning to strike down a state policy
prohibiting the inclusion of political views in electric bills. According to the Court, home
occupants were not sufficiently captive since they could simply throw the billing inserts

away. Id. at 542. Rather than presuming captivity in the home, the Court determined that
the audience was not captive because the mailed material was not sufficiently intrusive.
See id. at 542 n.l. But see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 645 (1951)
(upholding ban on door-to-door commercial solicitation in order to protect the privacy of

the home).
237. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (alterations in
original) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
238. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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arguments that such programs interfered with individual
conversations and that the First Amendment "guarantee[d] a
freedom to listen only to such points of view as the listener wishes to
'
hear."239
Over Justice Douglas's dissent,24 ° the Court rebuffed the
argument that individuals had a privacy right while in transit cars that
was comparable to one in the home. 24' Any such privacy right was
"substantially limited by the rights of others" and did not permit
242
regulation absent a situation involving excessive noise as in Kovacs.
Pollak thus continued the common law tradition, which recognizes
privacy rights in public spaces rarely and only after balancing the
right to be left alone against others' rights. By looking to the nature
of the intrusion to determine if privacy was invaded, Pollak also
hearkened back to Martin and Kovacs.
2 43
Cohen v. California
seemingly entrenched the notion that

privacy interests seldom justify regulation of speech when the
audience is in public. Cohen reversed a defendant's breach of peace
conviction for wearing a jacket bearing the message, "Fuck the
Draft," while in a courthouse. The Court rejected the argument that
people in the courthouse were a captive audience, holding:
[T]he mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers
does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech
capable of giving offense.

See, e.g., Organizationfor a Better

Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). While
recognized that government may properly
situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy
unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be

this Court has
act in many
of the home of
totally banned

from the public dialogue, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397

U.S. 728 (1970), we have at the same time consistently stressed
that "we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home
and subject to objectionable speech." Id., at 738. The ability of
government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other
words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy

239. Id. at 463.
240. Id. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The streetcar audience is a captive audience.
It is there as a matter of necessity, not of choice ....One who tunes in on an offensive
program at home can turn it off ....But the man on the streetcar has no choice but to sit
and listen, or perhaps to sit and to try not to listen." (emphasis in original)).
241. Id. at 464. The Court discussed this aspect primarily in the context of a Fifth
Amendment challenge to the policy, but its reasoning is also relevant to the free speech
issue.
242. Id.
243. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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interests244are
manner.

being invaded in an essentially intolerable

Cohen, like many earlier cases, located the heart of privacy in the
home. It did not, however, limit privacy to that space. Instead, the
Court indicated the possibility of more limited privacy interests in
certain public areas.245 Cohen's actions, however, did not invade
privacy interests in "an essentially intolerable manner. "246
Regrettably, the Court in Cohen never explained when speech in
public did invade privacy interests although it apparently linked
privacy and captivity. Cohen distinguished "persons confronted with
Cohen's jacket" from "those subjected to the raucous emissions of
sound trucks blaring outside their residences. 2 47 The latter were
captive while the former could "effectively avoid further
248
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.
Cohen's reasoning turned on the type of intrusion
(uncontrollable noise as opposed to written communication) when
differentiating raucous sound trucks from written messages,
suggesting an allegiance with earlier cases like Martin and Kovacs.
But the Court's distinction between the home and the courthouse,
coupled with its admonition that one is rarely captive in public,
equates the home with captivity as in Rowan. At the very least, the
Court treats captivity as a function of place, rather than a prerequisite
to intrusion. Accordingly, Cohen did not clarify the Court's murky
doctrine regarding privacy interests. Post-Cohen cases continued the
confusion.
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,249 a plurality upheld a
policy excluding political, but not commercial, advertisements from
placards on a city-operated transit system.5 0 Citing Justice Douglas's
dissent in Pollak, the plurality reasoned that " '[t]he streetcar
audience is a captive audience. It is there as a matter of necessity, not
of choice.' "251 Unlike the radio broadcasts in Pollak, transit riders
244. Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 21-22 ("[I]t may be that one has a more substantial claim to a recognizable
privacy interest when walking through a courthouse corridor than, for example, strolling
through Central Park, [but] surely it is nothing like the interest in being free from
unwanted expression in the confines of one's own home." (alterations in original)).
246. Id. at 21.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
250. Id. at 304.
251. Id. at 302 (quoting Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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could not escape political messages which were " 'thrust upon them
by all the arts and devices that skill can produce.' "252 Lehman thus

appears to link captivity with one's mere presence in a transit car.253
25 4
Previously, the Court refused to uphold bans on written messages.

Lehman, however, allowed such bans simply because the audience
was confined, even though passengers presumably could move to
avoid a written advertisement.255
Furthermore, the plurality
expanded the notion of "offensive speech" to include political or
controversial, and not merely indecent, speech. Accordingly, the
audience in Lehman was captive only to speech it did not want to

hear rather than speech it could not avoid.
In contrast, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville256 ruled that privacy
interests of an unsuspecting passersby did not justify an ordinance
banning nudity on drive-in movie screens.2 7 Government attempts
"to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that
they are more offensive than others," the Court stated, "have been
upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or
the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer
or auditor to avoid exposure. "258

Individuals on the street plainly

were not in such a position with respect to drive-in movie theaters.
The Court continued,
[I]n our pluralistic society,

...

"we are inescapably captive

audiences for many purposes." Much that we encounter
offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to
decide

which

types

of

otherwise

protected

speech

are

252. Id.
253. See Strauss, supra note 134, at 98.
254. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing differences between
written and aural invasions in past cases). In Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932),
the Court upheld a state regulation prohibiting tobacco advertisements on billboards and
other public signs. Id. at 112. The case did not involve a free speech challenge and the
Court discussed captivity in the context of whether the statute was arbitrary in violation of
the equal protection clause. Id. at 108. For a discussion of Packer, see Geoffrey R. Stone,
Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP. Cr. REV. 233, 268 (1974). Packer has
been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Haiman, supra note 202, at 178.
255. The plurality's finding that the transit cars were nonpublic fora, Lehman, 418 U.S.
at 303-04, also had a substantial effect on the Court's decision. Government officials have
greater leeway in such fora than in public fora and may enact content-based restrictions as
long as they do not attempt to suppress viewpoint. See supra note 60 for a discussion of
rules in nonpublic fora.
256. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
257. Id. at 217-18.
258. Id. at 209 (citing Lehman, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974); Rowan v. Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970)).
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sufficiently offensive to require protection
listener or viewer. Rather, absent ... narrow
the burden normally falls upon the viewer
bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply
eyes. "259

for the unwilling
circumstances,...
to "avoid further
by averting [his]

Erznoznik reaffirms Cohen's principle that privacy interests
rarely justify speech restrictions in public.
However, it also
potentially equates captivity with presence in a particular place. 2 °
First, it directly cites Lehman and Rowan in its discussion of the
notions of captivity and intrusion.2 1' Both earlier decisions use
extremely generous interpretations of those terms.
Second,
Erznoznik apparently accepted the notion that one can occasionally
be captive to offensive speech based on its content.262 It is unclear
from the Court's decisions whether speech need be intrusive in any
other way. Even Justice Stevens in Pacifica cast the nature of the
broadcast medium as invasive.2 63 By Erznoznik, however, that aspect
of the case appears to have been lost. Instead, offensiveness coupled
with presence in a particular space might be sufficient to support
regulation.
These foundational cases leave us with a great deal of confusion.
One can potentially justify and explain them individually, but as a
network of coherent jurisprudence and rhetoric, that task is more
difficult.
Overall, the Supreme Court's recognition of privacy
interests, like the common law, focuses on two main issues: whether
speech can be characterized as intrusive; and whether the audience
can be said to have carved out a place in which it has a right to claim
seclusion from (or rather exclusion of) intrusive speech.
Unfortunately, the Court has not been careful with terms such as
"intrude," "privacy," "unwanted," "offensive," and "captive." Thus,
its sometimes careless characterizations of past precedent also point
in different directions regarding the parameters of the Court's privacy
interest.

259. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210-11 (alterations in original) (quoting Rowan, 397 U.S.
at 736; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
260. See id., 422 U.S. at 209.
261. Id.
262. Id. (noting limited situations in which "government, acting as censor, [may]
undertake[] selecting to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that
they are more offensive than others").
263. See supra note 232.
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Privacy and Protestors

Cases involving the relationship between privacy and protestors
gained momentum in the late 1980s, although the Court occasionally
faced the issue in earlier decisions. Generally, however, earlier
decisions either recognized the importance of residential privacy
while nevertheless refusing to restrict protests264 or upheld statutes
prohibiting invasive protests without directly referencing privacy
interests. 265 Although referencing the rhetoric of the earlier decisions,

later cases do the heavy lifting when analyzing privacy interests.
In Frisby v. Schultz, 266 the Court upheld a content-neutral

ordinance banning "focused picketing"-defined as picketing
directed at a single residence as opposed to generalized picketing in a
neighborhood or residential area.267 Motivated by a series of antiabortion protests outside of a physician's residence,268 the law's

purpose was to protect the "well-being, tranquility, and privacy" of
the home. 269 The Court acknowledged the home as the "last citadel of
the tired, the weary, and the sick" and had little trouble recognizing
residential privacy as a legitimate government interest. 270 The Court
continued:
One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the
unwilling listener .... "That we are often 'captives' outside the
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech does
not mean we must be captives everywhere." Instead, a special
benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls,
264. Justice Black, for example, voted to strike down protestors' convictions under a
vague statute in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), but also noted that "the
homes of men, sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary and the sick, can be
protected by government from noisy, marching, tramping, threatening picketers and
demonstrators bent on filling the minds of men, women, and children with fears of the
unknown." Id. at 125-26 (Black, J., concurring). Similarly, in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 471 (1980), the Court struck down a content-based law regulating residential labor
picketing, although it recognized the important interest in "[p]reserving the sanctity of the
home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations
of their daily pursuits." Id. at 455.
265. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118 (1972) (upholding restrictions
on noisy and disruptive protests near schools during school sessions). For a discussion of
the case, see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
266. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
267. Id. at 483-84.
268. Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F. Supp. 792, 793-94 (E.D. Wis. 1985), rev'd, 487 U.S. 474
(1988).
269. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 477. Town officials believed that focused picketing invaded
privacy by harassing home occupants and causing emotional distress. Id.
270. Id. at 484 (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring)).
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which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid
intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are
not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own
homes and that the government may protect this freedom ....
This principle is reflected even in prior decisions in which we
have invalidated complete bans on expressive activity, including
bans operating in residential areas.27 '
Frisby's outcome is hardly surprising given the Court's
recognition of the home as a locus of privacy interests and its
increasing acceptance of the captive audience rationale in other
cases.2" In fact, Frisby made clear that, as a normative matter, the
home's importance as a refuge from the outside world supported state
attempts to protect occupants from unwanted intrusions.
Unfortunately, the decision did not clarify exactly how targeted
protests constitute intrusions into the home. The Court described
focused picketing as "inherently and offensively intru[sive] on
residential privacy" because" 'the home becomes something less than
a home .... [The] tensions and pressures may be psychological, not
physical, but they are not, for that reason, less inimical to family
privacy and truly domestic tranquility.' "273 This statement could
equate focused picketing with harassment, a characterization that is
consistent with the common law approach and early free speech cases
like Martin.274 More likely, the Court's statement means that the
mere presence of targeted picketers constitutes an intrusion due to
the occupant's awareness of them.275 The unique nature of the home
and our normative assumptions about what should be required of its
occupants may justify an interpretation that equates the presence of
targeted protests with intrusion. In fact, such an interpretation is not
much different from finding that targeted protests amount to

271. Id. at 484-85.
272. Unsurprising does not equal uncontroversial. Justice Brennan argued that
protection of residential privacy did not require a ban on all peaceful picketing aimed at a
home. See id. at 492-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Commentators also characterized the
Court's decision as an expansion of privacy interest. See infra note 276.
273. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486 (alteration in original) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))
274. The Court's statement that the "medium of expression itself" is the evil, id. at 487,
and its unwillingness to read the ordinance as banning all protests in residential
neighborhoods, lends credence to this interpretation. See id. at 482. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486
(alteration in original) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting))
275. The Court's reference to psychological intrusion, even by "a solitary picket," id. at
487, and its willingness to rely on Pacifica and Rowan, suggest that the Court may have
leaned toward this interpretation. See id. at 484-85.
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harassment, although it defines the latter term more broadly as a
result of the home's involvement.276 The Court's confusing rhetoric,
however, is susceptible to misinterpretation outside of the context of
the case.
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 7 the Court again
faced a First Amendment challenge to regulation of focused
picketing, this time involving anti-abortion protests around health
clinics. After a series of disruptions and blockades by protestors, a
lower court issued an injunction limiting the protestors' expression in
order to protect the health and safety of women seeking medical
services, public order, and medical privacy.2 78 The Supreme Court
acknowledged that this combination of interests was sufficient to
justify an appropriately tailored and content-neutral injunction,2 79 but
its analysis of the privacy interest in the context of the various
injunctive provisions is especially noteworthy.
The lower court's injunction established two buffer zones from
which all picketing or demonstrating was banned-a thirty-six-foot
zone around the health clinic and a 300-foot zone around the homes
of clinic staff.28 ° The Madsen Court upheld the thirty-six-foot zone
because, like Frisby, it regulated focused picketing and was designed
to protect against protestors' interference with access to the clinic. 81
It struck down the 300-foot zone, however, because it banned
"[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or even
walking a route in front of an entire block of houses."282

276. Numerous commentators, however, argued that Frisby expanded the Court's
existing doctrine. One commentator noted that "Frisby suggests the emergence of a new
doctrine within first amendment jurisprudence that protects the home as an oasis from the
hustle and bustle of the 'marketplace of ideas.' " The Supreme Court, 1987 TermLeading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 261, 266 (1988); see also Strauss, supra note 134, at 94
(criticizing Frisby's determination that one can be "figuratively" trapped in one's house);
Robert E. Rigby, Jr., Comment, Balancing Free Speech in a Public Forum vs. Residential
Privacy: Frisby v. Schultz, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889, 915 (1989) (criticizing Frisby's
expansion of captive audience doctrine).
277. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
278. Id. at 767-68.
279. Id. at 768. Over Justice Scalia's dissent, the majority found the injunction to be
content-neutral since it was motivated by the protestors' past conduct, and none of the
provisions facially regulated the content of the protestors' speech. Id. at 762-63. For
discussion regarding the Madsen injunction and content-neutrality, see Wells, supra note
55, at 30-46.
280. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 759-60.
281. Id. at 769.
282. Id. at 775 (alteration in original).
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Madsen also upheld the lower court's restriction on singing,
chanting, or using sound amplification equipment during clinic hours,
reasoning that:
Noise control is particularly important around hospitals and
medical facilities during surgery and recovery periods .... The
First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical
facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of
political protests. "If overamplified loudspeakers assault the
'
citizenry, government may turn them down." 283
However, the desire to protect patients did not justify the provision
banning displays of images observable to those inside the clinic. The
only "plausible reason" that such images would bother a patient
inside the clinic, the Court argued, was if she "found the expression
contained in such images disagreeable. But it is much easier for the
clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up her ears .... 2
The Court similarly struck down the "no-approach" portion of the
injunction, which prevented all uninvited approaches by protestors
within a 300-foot zone of the clinic.285 Without evidence that the
speech was "independently proscribable"-i.e., involved harassment,
violence, or fighting wordsZ8 6 -a prohibition on peaceful, uninvited
approaches restricted speech simply because it was outrageous or
insulting.287
Madsen recognized a privacy interest in public but the opinion's
fragmented nature makes it difficult to discern the parameters of that
interest. In recognizing medical patients' need for tranquility and
solitude, the Court acknowledged that people can be captive to
protests in public spaces. This captivity is different from Frisby,
however. Madsen recognized that medical patients were captive to
noisy protests but required them to avert their eyes to exterior
images. In Frisby, on the other hand, the Court protected occupants
of the home not only from invasive speech but also from the
emotional distress caused by knowledge of protestors' presence.
Madsen thus distinguished between kinds of invasive speech in ways
that Frisby did not and further found that speech was intrusive only if
one truly could not avoid seeing or hearing it. The Court's treatment
283. Id. at 772-73 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)).
284. Id. at 773. The Court also noted that the ban on images observable was too broad
to apply only to threatening speech. Id. at 772-73.
285. Id. at 776.
286. Id. at 774 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
292-93 (1941)).
287. Id. at 774 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
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of the thirty-six-foot buffer zone followed similar reasoning, as it
noted that the zone was necessary to protect access to the clinic and
against disruption. Although Madsen cited Frisby, it was not
concerned with protests outside clinics as inherently intrusive but
rather with the concrete invasions such protests cause. 88
Accordingly, Madsen accepted Frisby's inherent intrusiveness289
explanation of focused picketing but relegated it to the home where
privacy interests were especially unique.
Madsen is less clear about the status of captivity while on public
streets. The Court never discussed the issue directly in the context of
the "no-approach" zone. In addition, the meaning of its requirement
that speech be "independently proscribable" is not clear. One could
interpret that statement as requiring harassment in order to find
captivity, which is consistent with the common law's approach to
privacy. However, one could also interpret that requirement as a
simple statement that speech must be low-value to be restricted.
Either way, Madsen's treatment of the no-approach zone was a
resounding affirmation of Cohen and Erznoznik's requirement that
individuals endure much offensive speech in public.
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network 29 ° reaffirmed Madsen's
conclusions. Schenck involved the constitutionality of an injunction
requiring that protestors attempting to counsel another person
entering a health clinic " 'cease and desist' upon request."29 ' The
lower court issued the injunction "to protect the right of the people
approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone." 2 The
Supreme Court upheld the "cease and desist" provision but explicitly
rejected the lower court's rationale as not accurately reflecting its
jurisprudence.2 93 Madsen's injunction, the Court explained, was
designed to protect access to clinics and not a generalized " 'right to
'
be let alone' on a public street or sidewalk."294
Schenck not only
rejected the argument that privacy interests in public spaces
288. The Court emphasized the unique nature of the privacy interest in the home when
it reviewed the 300-foot buffer zone around the homes of clinic staff. Madsen, 512 U.S. at
775 (noting that Frisby "remarked on the unique nature of the home as 'the last citadel of
the tired, the weary, and the sick' " (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988))).
Even that privacy interest, however, was insufficient to support the injunction, as it was
too broad to be aimed at only targeted picketing.
289. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
290. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
291. Id. at 366 n.3.
292. Id. at 370 (quoting Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y. v. Project Rescue W. N.Y.,
799 F. Supp. 1417, 1435 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
293. Schenk, 519 U.S. at 383-85.
294. Id. at 370.
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encompassed protection from offensive speech, it also limited the
captive audience rationale to spatially-bounded places. Thus, in
reviewing the state's interest, which largely overlapped with those
identified in Madsen, the Court noted that it need not consider the
issue of medical privacy because the case did not involve speech
intruding into the medical clinic.295 Instead, the Court upheld the
injunction as a content-neutral regulation of speech based on the
petitioners' prior harassing and intimidating conduct.2 96
Frisby, Madsen, and Schenck establish that protests can invade
the privacy interests of others. The parameters of that privacy
interest and whether it is invaded, however, are decidedly different
depending on the location of the audience and the nature of the
speech involved. Building on the principles gleaned from the
foundational cases discussed earlier, Frisby, Madsen, and Schenck
establish the following propositions: first, one's privacy interest is at
the apex in the home, an area where the Court defines that interest
more broadly than in other spaces; second, audience members have a
privacy interest in other spatially-bounded places but that interest
extends primarily to freedom from physical or aural invasions; and
finally, audience members have little expectation of privacy when in
traditional public fora, such as streets, parks, and sidewalks. Hill v.
297 however, appeared to
Colorado,
throw the last of these principles
into doubt.
C.

Hill v. Colorado

As with the immediately preceding cases, Hill arose out of
attempts to rein in anti-abortion protests near clinics. To preserve
access to health care treatment and health care facilities,298 Colorado
enacted a law barring anyone from:
[K]nowingly approach[ing] another person within eight feet of
such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose
of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such

295. Id. at 376 n.8.
296. Id. at 384-85. For criticism of the Court's treatment of the injunction as contentneutral, see Christina E. Wells, Of Communists and Anti-Abortion Protestors: The
Consequences of FallingInto the TheoreticalAbyss, 33 GA. L. REV. 1, 59-62 (1998).
297. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
298. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-126 (2007) (noting that "access to health care facilities
for the purpose of obtaining medical counseling and treatment is imperative for the
citizens of this state" and recognizing a "person's right to obtain medical counseling and
treatment in an unobstructed manner").
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other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius
of one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care
facility.299

The Court upheld the law in a 6-3 decision, finding it to be a
reasonable content-neutral, time, place, and manner restriction.300
The Court's discussion of the privacy interest was particularly
controversial. 0 1

At the outset, it was not clear that privacy interests were
involved at all. The stated interests underlying the consent zone
involved access to clinics and health care. The lower court did not
refer to privacy interests when assessing the validity of the state's
interest.3 2 Similarly, the state's brief, although referring to several
privacy and captive audience cases, took pains to characterize the
consent provision as protecting clinic patients from threat and
intimidation caused by close approaches in the eight-foot zone.30 3

There was logic to the lower court and respondent's approach. The
statute regulated only peaceful protests and counseling attempts
within eight feet of individuals near clinics.30 4 Thus, the only area in
which speech could potentially invade privacy involved open, public
space and not spatially-bounded areas as in Madsen and Frisby.

Accordingly, addressing the privacy interest would have meant
299. Id. § 18-9-122(3).
300. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-30.
301. The finding of content-neutrality was also controversial. The dissenting justices
argued that a statute regulating protests, counseling, or education outside of medical
clinics was content-based. Id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 766-67 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Scholars also criticized Hill's "unwillingness to pierce the veil of the law's
apparent facial content-neutrality." Kathleen Sullivan, Sex, Money and Groups: Free
Speech and Association Decisions in the October 1999 Term, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 737
(2001); see also David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call it Marriage:" The First Amendment and
Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 993 n.361 (2001); Heidi
Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner
and the First Amendment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1339, 1400 (2002); Krotoszynski &
Carpenter, supra note 152, at 1262-63; Jamin Raskin & Clark I. LeBlanc, Disfavored
Speech About FavoredRights: Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need
for an Objective Speech DiscriminationTest, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 179, 208-12 (2001).
302. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1258 (Colo. 1999) (referring only to the statutorily
stated interests), affd sub nom. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
303. Brief on the Merits for Respondents Ken Salazar, State of Colorado, Bill Owens,
Governor, and City of Lakewood at 23, Hill, 530 U.S. 703 (No. 98-1856) (noting that the
consent provision "allows the individual accessing a medical clinic to control only whether
a demonstrator's message may be expressed in that individual's face or from a few steps
away. The statute is justified in part by patients' sense of intimidation and threat from the
manner and proximity of in-your-face approaches."); see also id. at 30-31 (discussing
protestor harassment to which patients were captive in small space).
304. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122 (2007).
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addressing whether such interests existed in open, public spaces-a
question the Court had seemingly answered negatively in Cohen,
Erznoznik, Madsen, and Schenck. Given the precedents, one can
understand why the participants in the lower court proceedings
conservatively approached the assessment of the state's interests.
The Supreme Court, however, chose to tackle the privacy issue.
The majority began by acknowledging the legitimacy of the state's
interest in preserving access to health care and medical clinics,3"5 and
noting that safety concerns "may justify a special focus on unimpeded
access to health care facilities and the avoidance of potential trauma
to patients associated with confrontational protests., 30 6 However, it
deliberately linked that discussion with a discussion of privacy
interests.
"It is also important when conducting this interest
analysis,"3 7 the Court noted, to differentiate between "restrictions on
a speaker's right to address a willing audience and those that protect
listeners from unwanted communication. This statute deals only with
3 8
the latter.""
The Court acknowledged that the right to persuade others "may
not be curtailed simply because the speaker's message may be
offensive to his audience."3 9 Citing to Frisby and Erznoznik,
however, it noted that the First Amendment "does not always
embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling
audience cannot avoid it."3"0 "Indeed, '[i]t may not be the content of
the speech, as much as the deliberate 'verbal or visual assault,' that
justifies proscription.' "311
Having established that states may
sometimes regulate intrusive offensive speech, the Court then
surveyed settings in which one has a privacy interest in avoiding
offensive speech:
The recognizable privacy interest in avoiding unwanted
communication varies widely in different settings. It is far less
important when "strolling through Central Park" than when "in
the confines of one's own home," or when persons are
"powerless to avoid" it. [Cohen v. California,403 U.S. 15, 21-22
(1971).] But even the interest in preserving tranquility in "the
Sheep Meadow" portion of Central Park may at times justify

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Hill, 530 U.S. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 715-16.
Id. at 716.
Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988)).
Id. (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975)).
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official restraints on offensive musical expression. Ward [v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989).] More specific
to the facts of this case, we have recognized that "[t]he First
Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility
undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of
political protests." Madsen [v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,
512 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1994).]312

Although the Court's attempt to directly address the privacy
interest in different settings is laudable, the above rhetoric is
particularly confusing. The privacy interest evidently changes with
place and context and is decidedly less in Central Park than when one
is captive in the home or elsewhere, statements that are consistent
with past cases. Unfortunately, even though it cited Cohen's oftquoted passage, the Court did not explain the circumstances in which
one is "powerless to avoid" speech. Such an oversight is especially
disappointing given the Court's nod to clarifying its doctrine at the
beginning of the passage.313 Until Hill, the Court had largely confined
its recognition of captivity to spatially-bounded places although its
rhetoric was not always clear about this fact. Hill presented the Court
with the opportunity to discuss explicitly the core meaning of
captivity and, in particular, whether that notion was limited to
spatially-bounded areas or extended to classic public fora.
Along these lines, the majority's reference to regulating
"offensive musical expression" in Central Park may or may not have
implied that captivity can exist in the latter space. However, the case
to which the passage alludes, Ward v. Rock Against Racism,1 did not
involve captive audience analysis in upholding noise restrictions in
Central Park.315 Furthermore, this passage did not illuminate what
the Court meant by the term "offensive" expression. That term has
been used to describe a wide variety of expression, ranging from
simply noisy speech to speech with offensive content, each with vastly
different consequences. Without defining the term "offensive," it is
not clear which consequences the Court meant to invoke. The
majority may possibly have wanted to do no more than invoke its
noise control precedents, and certainly the Court's references to
Ward and Madsen support that explanation. But that interpretation
makes little sense in that particular context of Hill, which did not
involve noise levels. Furthermore, cloaking the issue in the rhetoric
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
315. Id.
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209

of "privacy," "offense," and "unwanted communications" seems to
broaden the concept of privacy beyond that context.
The Court's next attempt to elaborate on the privacy interest did
little to clarify the issue:
The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted
communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases. It
is an aspect of the broader "right to be let alone" that one of
our wisest Justices characterized as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the
privacy of the home, Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 297 U.S. 728,
738 (1970), and its immediate surroundings, Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. [474, 485 (1988),] but can also be protected in
confrontational settings....
None of our decisions has
minimized the enduring importance of "a right to be free" from
persistent "importunity, following and dogging" after an offer
to communicate has been declined. While the freedom to
communicate is substantial, "the right of every person 'to be let
alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others to
communicate." Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.316
As with the earlier passage, this excerpt is subject to multiple
interpretations. Its references to the "unwilling listener's interest in
avoiding unwanted communication" and the "right to be let alone"
encourage readers to interpret the privacy interest broadly despite
the Court's attempt to limit the right to certain contexts. Its
references to Frisby and Rowan highlight that privacy is paramount in
certain spatially bounded areas but also imply that such areas are
unnecessary if a confrontational setting exists. Although there may
be a relationship between confrontation and privacy interests, the
Court never clearly identified it. 317 Given the Court's past precedents
refusing to find a generalized right to be let alone on streets and
sidewalks, one can understand the dissenters' outrage at the
perceived creation of a new "right to avoid unpopular speech in a
public forum."3 18
316. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-18.
317. See William E.Lee, The Unwilling Listener: Hill v. Colorado's Chilling Effect on
Unorthodox Speech, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 387, 409 (2002) (describing Justice Stevens'
description of the term "confrontational settings" as "marvelously loose" and potentially
encompassing "labor picketing, anti-fur protests, gatherings of neo-Luddites, and
innumerable public disputes").
318. Hill, 530 U.S. at 771 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 753 n.3 (Scalia, J.
dissenting) ("[W]e have never made the absurd suggestion that a pedestrian is a 'captive'
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The majority denied the dissenters' accusation, claiming that it
was:
[N]ot addressing whether there is ... a "right" [to avoid
unpopular speech]. Rather, we are merely noting that our cases
have repeatedly recognized the interests of unwilling listeners
in situations where "the degree of captivity makes it impractical
for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure." See
Lehman [v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).] 3'9
Furthermore, the majority argued, this case simply did not involve
such a right:
The purpose of the Colorado statute is not to protect a
potential listener from hearing a particular message. It is to
protect those who seek medical treatment from the potential
physical and emotional harm suffered when an unwelcome
individual delivers a message (whatever its content) by
physically approaching an individual at close range, i.e., within
eight feet. In offering protection from that harm, while
maintaining free access to health clinics, the State pursues
interests constitutionally distinct from the freedom from
unpopular speech ....
It is difficult to decipher the majority's response. From the
opinion's beginning, the Court intentionally intertwined its
assessment of state interests regarding access to health clinics with a
3 21
discussion of the right to be free of unwanted communications.
Yet, here the Court eschewed that entanglement. The idea that the
opinion's discussion of privacy interests was merely an "observation"
simply is not plausible.322 It also is probably not what the Court

of the speaker who seeks to address him on the public sidewalks, where he may simply

walk quickly away."). Scholars also criticized Hill as an unwarranted extension of privacy
interests. Chen, supra note 100, at 54-55 (noting that Hill "without citing any authority ...
extended the state's interest in protecting persons from unwanted speech to other
'confrontational settings' "); Lee, supra note 317, at 409 (arguing that the privacy right
recognized in Hill "is without precedent"); Raskin & LeBlanc, supra note 301, at 203

(noting that "the Court's constitutionalization of an interest in being left alone against
unwanted speech in public places...

[is] at odds with the notion that the First

Amendment protects unpopular speech").
319. Hill, 530 U.S. at 718 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209

(1975)).
320. Id. at 718-19 n.25.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 718 ("[W]e are merely noting that our cases have repeatedly recognized the
interests of unwilling listeners.").
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intended although it requires some effort to unpack the Court's
meaning.
The key to the majority's approach comes in its characterization
of the expression subject to regulation within the eight-foot consent
zone. The opinion's reference to persistent "importunity, following
and dogging "323 suggests that the Court allowed regulation of speech
not because it involved an offensive idea but because it was
potentially harassing. Its claim that the law protected patients from
"the potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an
unwelcome individual delivers a message 3 24 similarly indicates a right
to be free of fear and intimidation in a reasonably enclosed space
rather than a right of audience members to turn away unwanted
ideas. Furthermore, this privacy interest was linked to the "right of
'passage without obstruction' "325 since individuals forced to run a
gauntlet of intimidation and abuse may abandon attempts to enter
medical clinics.326
Viewed in this light, the Court's rhetoric regarding the "right to
be let alone" in "confrontational '321 settings is reasonably narrow and
consistent with past precedent. Harassment is an aspect of the
common law privacy right-dogged following of another in public is
considered an intrusive invasion of privacy.3 28 Furthermore, Madsen
indicated that expression analogous to harassment, i.e., speech
involving fighting words, threats, or violence, might have justified the
"no-approach" zone involved in that case.329 Accordingly, Hill's
323. Id.
324. Id. at 718-19 n.25.
325. Id. at 718.

326. Citing a passage involving labor disputes from the early twentieth century, the
majority noted that:

In going to and from work, men have a right to as free a passage without
obstruction as the streets afford .... [If an offer of communication is declined], as
it may rightfully be, persistence, importunity, following and then dogging become
unjustifiable annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savor of
intimidation.
Id. at 717 (quoting American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 204 (1921)). Justice Scalia accused the majority of "distort[ing] First Amendment
law" by relying on an inapposite Clayton Act decision. Id. at 753-54 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting). Justice Scalia correctly notes that the majority carelessly used rhetoric, as
opposed to analysis, to make its argument. But the cited passage appeared to be making
the point that, at times, unwanted communications can devolve into harassment and
obstruction. That simple fact is relevant to assessing privacy interests regardless of the
case from which it is derived.
327. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-18.
328. See supra note 165.
329. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
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willingness to recognize audience captivity to harassing speech in a
small, carefully defined area is not a significant extension of the law.
That said, the breadth of majority's rhetoric about the "right to
be let alone" detracts from a narrower characterization of the privacy
interest. Without clear analysis, the majority opinion encourages
litigants and later courts to rely primarily on that rhetoric.
Furthermore, the majority repeatedly relied on quotations from its
past privacy cases without considering their context. Indeed, the
decision relies on quotes from Madsen, Frisby, Erznoznik, Cohen,

Rowan, and Lehman, none of which provided direct insight into the
parameters of the privacy right in Hill. Given the carelessness with
which earlier Courts described the parameters of the privacy right,
reliance on that rhetoric merely continued uncertainty regarding the
Court's doctrine. Finally, although earlier harassing and abusive antiabortion protests in Colorado appear to have motivated the Court's
decisions,330 the Hill protestors were never "abusive or
confrontational."33 ' This, coupled with the fact that the statute
allowed regulation upon a counselor's first approach,33 is
problematic. It allows readers to view Hill as a prophylactic decision,
protecting a right to be free from unwanted communication in public
spaces.
Thus, Hill cemented the somewhat schizophrenic nature of the
Court's privacy cases. It embraces a narrow conception of privacy as
well as broader privacy rhetoric. Recent litigation involving the
constitutionality of funeral protest statutes reflects the resulting
confusion over Hill and the Supreme Court's privacy doctrine.
IV. PRIVACY, DIGNITY, AND COMMUNICATIVE IMPACT

Members and supporters of the Westboro Baptist Church have
challenged funeral protest statutes in three states.333

The Court's

privacy cases feature prominently in the litigation, as government
officials rely on the broader aspects of Hill and the Court's privacy
rhetoric to argue in favor of a broad right to be left alone. Lower
330. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 709-10. The lower court reviewed the legislative history
regarding the nature of such protests in some detail. Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1247
(Colo. 1999), affd sub nom. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
331. Hill, 530 U.S. at 710.
332. Kitrosser, supra note 301, at 1404 (noting that "the statute does not target
persistent pursuit or long-term, unwanted contact...").
333. See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693 (W.D. Mo. 2007), rev'd, 509
F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007); Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 614 (N.D. Ohio 2007),
affd sub nom. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 2008 FED App. 0312P, 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir.
2008); McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 977 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
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courts have often agreed with state officials, finding that privacy
interests justify significant restrictions of peaceful funeral protests.
Section A briefly surveys litigation involving statutes in Ohio,
Missouri, and Kentucky and highlights that both state officials and

lower courts interpret

the Court's free speech decisions as

encompassing a broad right to be free of offensive speech. Section B

explains how these interpretations amount to recognition of a civilitybased privacy interest and also discusses the implications of such an

interpretation for the Court's free speech doctrine. Finally, Section C
describes a privacy interest that is consistent with the Court's current
doctrine and how that interest, which is grounded in common law

notions of intrusion, justifies certain kinds of funeral protest statutes.
A.

Litigation Involving Peaceful FuneralProtestStatutes

The statutes in Ohio, Missouri, and Kentucky restrict peaceful
protests in slightly different ways. Missouri's law prohibits all

protests "in front of or about" funeral ceremonies for an hour before
or after the ceremony.334 Ohio's law prohibits funeral protests within
300 feet of funeral ceremonies and processions.3 35 Kentucky also
prohibited protesting within 300 feet of a funeral as well as singing,
chanting, making loud noises, or showing observable images within
eyesight or earshot of funeral goers.336 Members or supporters of the

Westboro

Baptist

Church

challenged

each

statute

on First

Amendment grounds, usually arguing that they were prior restraints,
overly broad, and potentially content-based. 337 Focusing primarily on

the content discrimination issue, courts agree that the statutes are

334. Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (West Supp. 2008).
335. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.30 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
336. Act of March 27, 2006, 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 50, sec 5(b)-(c). A federal court found
the statute unconstitutional in McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 977 (E.D. Ky.
2006). Kentucky enacted a new law prohibiting protests that obstruct access to or
otherwise interfere with a funeral, or which involve violence or disorderly conduct. See
KY REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.055-060 (West 2007). Interestingly, Kentucky's new statute
defines as disruptive any "utterance, gesture, or display designed to outrage the
sensibilities of the group attending the occasion." Id. § 525.145.
337. See, e.g., Complaint at 5, Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612 (No. 1:06-CV-02038) (alleging
that the statute was a prior restraint and overly broad); Complaint at 13-19, Nixon, 504 F.
Supp. 2d 691 (No. 06-4156-CV-C-NKL) (alleging, among other things, that the statute was
content-based, overly broad, and violated the group's association rights); Complaint at 45, McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (No. 06-24-KKC) (alleging, among other things, that
statute was a prior restraint and overly broad). Members of the Westboro Baptist Church
challenged the Ohio and Missouri laws. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 615; Nixon, 504 F. Supp.
2d at 694. Bart McQueary, a supporter but not a member of the Church, challenged the
Kentucky law. McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
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content-neutral.338 Accordingly, they have analyzed the statutes using
intermediate scrutiny, asking whether they are narrowly tailored to
meet legitimate state interests and leave open ample alternatives of
expression.33 9
1. The States' Description of Privacy Interests and Captive

Audiences
The states justify their laws as necessary to protect the privacy
interests of mourners who are captive at funeral ceremonies, relying
on Frisby, Madsen, Hill, and rhetoric from foundational privacy cases.

Citing Frisby, Missouri asserted that "citizens are, in many ways,
more captive when attending funerals than when in their own homes"
since "one should not callously assert that individuals are free to
leave a funeral or burial of family member or friend.""34
Ohio
asserted that "like medical patients entering a medical facility, funeral
'
attendees are captive."3 41
State officials also described mourning as a

time of extreme grief and emotional vulnerability, which they argued
supported recognition of a privacy interest.342 One state's brief noted,
"the Supreme Court's holdings in Frisby and Madsen indicate a clear

recognition that the First Amendment does not require individuals in
'
sensitive circumstances to endure intrusive speech."343

338. The federal court in Missouri specifically rejected the plaintiffs' content
discrimination argument, finding the laws to be content-neutral under the Supreme
Court's precedents, including Hill. See Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 695. The district court in
Kentucky also devoted significant discussion to this issue, ultimately concluding that the
law was content-neutral. McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 981-86. The Ohio district court
proceeded from an assumption of content-neutrality as the plaintiffs did not argue
otherwise. See Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 618. The Sixth Circuit, however, explicitly found
the statute to be content-neutral. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 2008 FED App. 0312P, 539
F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 2008).
339. See cases cited supra note 152 and accompanying text.
340. Appellees' Brief, supra note 32, at 33; see also Response Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in Support of Defendant's
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 35, McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (No. 06-24KKC) [hereinafter McQueary Response Memorandum] ("[P]rotecting the privacy of
grieving families at cemeteries and funeral homes from pickets and protesters is at least as
significant, if not more so, than [sic] shielding individuals from unwanted speech in their
homes.").
341. State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 31, at 13-14.
342. See Appellees' Brief, supra note 32, at 33; State Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 31, at 19 ("[M]ourners made emotionally vulnerable by grief are
entitled to be left alone to deal with their loss in privacy."); McQueary Response
Memorandum, supra note 342, at 32 (noting that "privacy right or interests [sic] is
especially compelling during a funeral because of the great potential by protesting at
funerals to cause emotional trauma to those close family members grieving the loss of a
loved one").
343. Appellees' Brief, supra note 32, at 34.
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State officials also relied on the "right to be let alone" rhetoric in
Missouri asserted that funeral goers "have no means by which
to simply avoid speech they do not want to hear. It is entirely
unreasonable to suggest that the First Amendment forces individuals
and families to forgo collective mourning if they are to avoid hateful
'
The Attorney General of Kentucky similarly argued that
speech."345
funeral goers were captive audiences entitled to be free of unwanted
messages in a time of extreme emotional vulnerability.3 46 Ohio
characterized the appropriate standard for judging captivity as
follows:
Hill.3"

[T]he degree to which people's privacy can be protected
without running afoul of the First Amendment is a function of
the nature of the activity taking place in the location targeted
by the protestors. If it is a private activity, if the persons
engaged in it are a captive audience for protestors, and if the
protest would be, if left unregulated, essentially intolerable,
[the state may regulate].347
The states' arguments fundamentally misread the Court's cases.
They attempt, for example, to characterize funeral protests as
inherently intrusive in the same way that Frisby characterized
targeted protests near the home. Frisby, however, recognized such
protests as inherently intrusive due to the state's interest in preserving
the home as a refuge from the everyday world. 34 That interest does
not exist when we are in public, even when attending funerals, and
the Court's precedents limit the "inherently intrusive" aspect of
Frisby to the home.349 Thus, Madsen made clear that the state interest
in protecting medical patients from targeted protests extends only to
Furthermore, it is not clear
noisy or physically disruptive protests.'
344. All states quoted liberally from Hill. See id. at 34 (citing to passages from Hill set
forth supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text); State Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 31, at 13-14 (citing to passages from Hill set forth supra notes 31220 and accompanying text); McQueary Response Memorandum, supra note 342, at 29-30
(citing to passages from Hill set forth supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text).
345. Appellees' Brief, supra note 32, at 33.
346. McQueary Response Memorandum, supra note 342, at 35 ("Persons attending a
funeral service are as much unwilling captive audiences as those who are targeted by
pickets in their residences .... 'A funeral home seems high on the list of places where
people legitimately could be or should be protected from unwanted messages.' "); id. at
29-30 (quoting Professor Michael Dorf).
347. State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 31, at 19.
348. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
349. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 752 (2000); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.,
512 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1994).
350. See supranote 283 and accompanying text.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

that the statutes at issue, which apply to all peaceful protests within
hundreds of feet of a funeral, actually regulate targeted protests.
Frisby and Madsen held that a general ban on all protests was not a
narrowly drawn regulation of focused or disruptive protests.35'
Accordingly, the states are wrong to characterize peaceful protests as
inherently intrusive.
Ohio's attempt to justify its 300-foot zone by likening funeral
goers to captive "medical patients entering a medical facility" is also
misguided. The Supreme Court has never held that one is captive
simply because one must pass by protestors in order to get to one's
destination. Madsen and Schenck found that patients inside the clinic
have a privacy interest in being free from noisy disruptions.352 Hill
did not hold that people entering a clinic were captive merely when
faced with unwanted speech. Rather, it held that people in certain
well-defined areas have a privacy interest in being free from harassing
and intimidating speech.353 The states' attempt to link mourners'
psychological vulnerability to captivity does not solve their problem.
The possible psychological effects of protests on patients clearly
concerned the justices in Madsen and Hill. But neither decision held
that such vulnerability was alone sufficient reason to regulate all
protests.
Rather, psychological vulnerability, combined with
potential physical complications resulting from the medical
procedure, justified recognition of a privacy interest in freedom from
noisy or potentially harassing protests.354
This distinction is enormously important in understanding the
flaws in the states' arguments. It highlights the Court's attempts to
distinguish speech that may be offensive, even psychologically
painful, but to which we are not unavoidably captive, from speech
that is emotionally and physically harmful precisely because we
cannot escape it, as in the case of excessive noise or harassment.
Only the latter provides a satisfactory description of captive
audiences in public places without running afoul of the Court's
" 'longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because [it] may have an
adverse emotional impact on the audience.' "I" This distinction also
351. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 320, 323-29 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 283, 324 and accompanying text.
355. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)). Since Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court has
repeatedly rejected this notion. Every court to discuss captivity alludes to it. Even
Pacifica noted that regulation of offensive ideas was inconsistent with the First
Amendment. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). The crucial issue has
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reveals the error in Missouri's claim that the state may regulate
"hateful" speech near funerals and Kentucky's claim that it could
protect mourners from unwanted messages.3 56 Both arguments
amount to little more than a claim that the state may protect
mourners from offensive ideas. Ohio's characterization of the Court's
privacy cases has similar flaws. How does one determine when a
gathering in public is "private" and whether protests "if left
unregulated" are "essentially intolerable?"35' 7 Such a description
leaves officials ample room to regulate simply because a protestor's
message is offensive.
2. Court Decisions
Most of the court decisions involving funeral protest statutes
suffer from the same flaws as the states' arguments. In Phelps-Roper
v. Nixon,358 for example, the district court refused to issue a
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Missouri's statute,
finding that the state would likely prevail at trial on the privacy
issue.359 Citing to Frisby, the court described mourners as "more
captive than citizens in their own homes" because "funeral
spectator[s] cannot leave the funeral or procession without missing
the opportunity to pay last respects to the deceased."3 6 Accordingly,
protestors' actions of "picketing soldiers' funerals and belittling the
sacrifices made by soldiers [were] intolerable," and the state met
Cohen's threshold showing that privacy interests were " 'invaded in
an essentially intolerable manner.' "361
The district court, like the state, assumed that audience members
were captive simply because they attended a particular function at
which they found protestors' message offensive. The court did not
been to determine when speech shades from mere offense into an invasion of privacy.
Cases like Frisby,Madsen, Schenck, and Hill attempt to draw those lines, although they do
not always succeed in clearly communicating them.
356. See text accompanying notes 344-46.
357. See text accompanying note 347.
358. 504 F. Supp. 2d 691 (W.D. Mo. 2007), rev'd 509 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007).
359. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 696. Members of the Westboro Baptist Church sought a
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the law. Id. Such requests are generally
governed by a four-prong inquiry: (1) whether plaintiff has irreparable injury; (2) whether
the balance of hardships tips in favor of plaintiff or defendant; (3) whether plaintiff can
show a likelihood of success on the merits at trial; and (4) in whose favor the public
interest weighs. See, e.g., Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir.
1981); see also DOBBS, supra note 182, § 2.11(2), at 187 (describing typical requirements
for preliminary injunctions).
360. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (emphasis in original).
361. Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
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attempt to explain how the protestors' actions disrupted or otherwise
intruded upon the ceremony other than to say that their act of
protesting and message were "intolerable." This is a substantial
extension of the Court's doctrine. As noted above, Frisby recognized
an especially broad privacy right in the home due to its unique nature
as a place of refuge. Later cases, however, refuse to extend that
broad privacy right in public, instead requiring a showing that speech
physically or aurally invades a defined space in ways that are
unavoidable. By recognizing a privacy interest in being free from
speech "belittling" the dignity of soldiers' memories, the district court
violated fundamental tenets of the Court's jurisprudence.
Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court,
holding that the plaintiff had "a fair chance" of proving that the
protestors' free speech rights outweighed the state's interest in
protecting mourners from unwanted speech.362 The court did not
discuss the issue in depth although it relied on an earlier Eighth
Circuit decision striking down an ordinance prohibiting focused
picketing near churches.36 3 According to that earlier decision, which

the Nixon court quoted with approval:
As the Supreme Court said in Frisby, "the home is different,"
and, in our view, unique. Allowing other locations, even
churches, to claim the same level of constitutionally protected
privacy would, we think, permit government to prohibit too
much speech and other communication. We recognize that
lines have to be drawn, and we choose to draw the line in such a
way as to give the maximum possible protection to speech,
364
which is protected by the express words of the Constitution.
As a result, the Eighth Circuit refused to extend a Frisby-like right to
privacy in public spaces.
The Eighth Circuit, however, remains the only court to find the
state's interest in privacy insufficient to justify a funeral protest
statute. However, the district court in McQueary v. Stumbo,365 which
paid special attention to the privacy interest, looked as if it might
make such a finding regarding Kentucky's law. McQueary thoroughly
reviewed the Supreme Court's cases from Cohen through Hill,366
summarizing the Court's doctrine as follows:
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 487 (8th Cir. 2007).
Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176, 1178 (8th Cir. 1999).
Nixon, 509 F.3d at 486-87 (quoting Olmer, 192 F.3d at 1178).
453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975,987-92 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
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[Although Hill] discussed an "unwilling listener's interest in
avoiding unwanted communications," it is not clear that, in the
end, the Court found the statute was justified by the state's
interest in protecting citizens from unwanted communications
.... The Supreme Court generally has resisted the invitation to
expand to public spaces the limited right of individuals to be
left alone inside their homes, even when the messages may
prove to be offensive to the listener .... Assuming that the
Court found the statute at issue in Hill was justified by the
state's interest in protecting citizens from unwanted
communications even when the citizens are outside the home,
the case may simply hold that the state has an interest in
protecting citizens from unwanted communications when the
communicator approaches within eight feet of the recipient
because such communications are so obtrusive that they are
impractical or impossible to avoid.367
Although this passage involves a nuanced and discerning
discussion of the Court's jurisprudence, the district court almost
immediately undercut it. According to the court, a "funeral is a
deeply personal, emotional and solemn occasion. Its attendees have
an interest in avoiding unwanted, obtrusive communications which is
at least similar to a person's interest in ... his home. Further, like
medical patients entering a medical facility, funeral attendees are
captive.""36 Such statements bear striking resemblance to the lower
court's reasoning in the Missouri litigation, suggesting a broad view of
mourners' privacy interests, including freedom from offensive speech.
The next passage further confused the issue: "Whatever the meaning
of Hill,... [we] will assume that the state has an interest in protecting
funeral attendees from unwanted communications that are so
'
obtrusive that they are impractical to avoid."369
This statement seems
to straddle both approaches, implying both a broad privacy interest
(protection from unwanted communications) and a narrow interest
(communications so obtrusive they are impractical to avoid).
Accordingly, McQueary never clarified its approach to the privacy
interest.
Although it eventually struck down the statute as
insufficiently tailored,37 ° the opinion's confusing discussion allowed
other courts to justify their recognition of a broad privacy interest.

367. Id. at 991-92.

368. Id. at 992.
369. Id.

370. Id. at 996. In its analysis, the court again focused on the nature of the privacy
interest. The court differentiated provisions restricting disruptive and noisy protestors
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Consequently, in Phelps-Roper v. Taft,37' the district court found
mourners sufficiently captive to justify the Ohio statute at issue.372
Family and friends of the deceased, the court wrote, " 'have [a]
personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and objecting to
unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own
grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord the
deceased person who was once their own.' ,7' Accordingly, the
Court concluded that because "mourners are a captive audience
unable to avoid communications simply by averting their eyes, the
State of Ohio has a significant interest in protecting its citizens from
disruption during the events associated with a funeral or burial
service. 3 74 As in Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, the court engaged in little
analysis, instead relying primarily on rhetoric, including McQueary's
statements acknowledging the existence of a privacy interest.3 75 The
court did not attempt to explain how protests disrupt funeral
ceremonies or how mourners are captive other than its statement that
protestors intrude upon mourners' grief and degrade dignity of
funeral rites. These statements, however, do not support a finding of
captivity under the Supreme Court's doctrine. The court did not find

from those prohibiting observable images, noting that privacy interests did not support
regulation of the latter. Id.
371. 523 F. Supp. 2d 612 (N.D. Ohio 2007), affd sub nom. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland,
2008 FED App. 0312P, 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2008).
372. Id. at 618-19. The court struck down the buffer zone around funeral processions
as "not narrowly tailored, in that it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to
serve the State of Ohio's interest protecting its citizens from disruption during the events
associated with a funeral or burial service. In other words, because the buffer zone
'floats,' the overbreadth is not only real, but substantial, when viewed in relation to the
statute's legitimate sweep." Id. at 620.
373. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 618 (quoting Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v.
Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004)). Favish involved a Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") request for death-scene photos pertaining to Vince Foster, a well-known
Clinton advisor who committed suicide. Government officials refused to disclose the
records citing to FOIA's privacy exemption. Id. at 161-62. The Supreme Court upheld
the government's refusal, finding that the privacy rights of Foster's family outweighed the
public interest in disclosure. Id. at 171-75. In so doing, the Court specifically noted that
FOIA's "statutory privacy right" was broader than the common law or the Constitution.
Id. at 170. Favish played a significant role in the Ohio litigation. See Phelps-Roper v.
Strickland, 2008 FED App. 0312P, 7, 539 F.3d. 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that
Favish's concerns and points were significant in the context of funeral services); Final
Brief for Defendant-Appellee, Governor Ted Strickland and Attorney General Marc
Dann at 10, Strickland,2008 FED App. 0312P, 539 F.3d 356 (No. 07-3600) (arguing Favish
supports Ohio's interest in protecting mourners' privacy). Because Favish arose in a
totally different context with a different privacy right, however, it is not a useful analogy.
374. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
375. Id. at 618-19 (quoting passage from McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975,
992 (E.D. Ky. 2006)).
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that protests physically or aurally disrupt funeral ceremonies. Nor
did it find the protests harassing. Rather, the core of its finding is that
protests disrespect funeral services and that mourners will be forced
to encounter them at some point. The court simply accepted the idea
that states can protect mourners from speech with offensive messages.
The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed the Ohio district court,
finding that the state had an important government interest in
' After
protecting "mourners at funerals from unwanted intrusions."3 76
reviewing Frisby, Hill, and Madsen,377 the court concluded that
burial rites implicate the most basic and universal human
expression "of the respect a society shows for the deceased and
." Unwanted intrusion
for the surviving family members ....
during the last moments the mourners share with the deceased
during a sacred ritual surely infringes upon the recognized right
of survivors to mourn the deceased.378
Noting that mourners could not "easily avoid unwanted protests
without sacrificing their right to partake in the funeral or burial
service," the court found funeral attendees to be captive to intrusive
and unwanted speech.3 79 As with the lower court, the Sixth Circuit
did not explain how otherwise peaceful protests disrupt funeral
ceremonies. Moreover, the court seems to have found captivity not
because the mourners were constantly exposed to protests during a
funeral but, rather, because mere knowledge of protestors' presence
inflicted emotional harm. s Such an approach does not ground
captivity in intrusion or disruption in the traditional sense. Rather, it
characterizes people attending an event as captive when they find
certain messages at the event offensive.381
376. Strickland,539 F.3d at 362.
377. Id. at 363-65. The Sixth Circuit also relied heavily on Favish. See supra note 373
for more detailed discussion of Favish.
378. Strickland,539 F.3d at 366 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 168).
379. Id.
380. Id. ("Nor can funeral attendees simply 'avert their eyes' to avoid exposure to
disruptive speech at a funeral or burial service. The mere presence of a protestor is
sufficient to inflict the harm.").
381. The court's finding that the law only prohibited targeted protests, id. at 368, does
not detract from this conclusion. Although the state may have legitimate reasons to
regulate targeted funeral protests, the Supreme Court has made clear that the government
may regulate targeted protests as inherently offensive or inherently intrusive only with
respect to the home. See, e.g., supra notes 280-86 and accompanying text. Outside of that
context, the Court has upheld regulations of targeted protests only when such protests
pose concrete harms, such as threatening access to medical facilitates. See, e.g., Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 769 (1994) (upholding thirty-six-foot buffer zone
barring targeted protests near medical clinic to preserve access to clinic facilities).
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Implications

Lower court decisions recognizing mourners' privacy rights at
funerals are a worrisome extension of the Court's doctrine. Their
reasoning disconnects notions of captivity from questions of physical,
aural, or harassing invasions, or from any significant inquiry into
whether the speech is truly unavoidable. Instead, courts characterize
protestors' actions and/or messages as "intolerable" because they
occur at or near funeral ceremonies, a place where they conclude
mourners are entitled to be left alone.382 Like the statutes initially

regulating peaceful protests, lower courts' equation of intrusiveness
with offensiveness recognizes a privacy interest that punishes
protestors because they have violated civility norms.
As discussed in Part JIB, protection of a civility-based privacy

interest violates fundamental tenets of the Court's jurisprudence.
That interest allows officials to regulate because of the
communicative impact of speech and potentially leads to unwarranted
discrimination against speakers.3 83 Ultimately, attempts to regulate
speech based upon the audience's response allow "a single

community to use the authority of the state to confine speech within
its own notions of propriety" 3"
standardization of ideas.385

and lead to an undesirable

382. A federal district court used similar reasoning when refusing to set aside a verdict
against the Westboro Baptist Church in an invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress lawsuit brought by the family of a soldier at whose funeral church
member's protested. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 581 (D. Md. 2008).
Maryland has adopted the Restatement's version of the intrusion tort. See Furman v.
Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 585-86 (Md. 2000). According to the court in Snyder, "[a]
reasonable jury could find ... that when Snyder turned on the television to see if there was
footage of his son's funeral, he did not 'choose' to see close-ups of the Defendant's signs
and interviews with Phelps and Phelps-Roper, but rather their actions intruded upon his
seclusion." Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 581. The court's reasoning allowed a common law
invasion of privacy lawsuit to proceed on the theory that plaintiffs were faced with
admittedly offensive speech about their son while watching television in their home. Such
reasoning turns the intrusion tort on its head. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
383. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) ("A 'dignity' standard, like the
'outrageousness' standard that we rejected in Hustler, is so inherently subjective that it
would be inconsistent with 'our longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the speech
in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.' " (quoting Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988)); Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55 ("An
'outrageousness' standard runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be
awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the
audience.").
384. Post, supra note 196, at 632 & n.165.
385. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) ("[A] function of free speech under
our system of government is to invite dispute ....
There is no room under our
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Arguably, the overwhelmingly negative response to funeral
protests does not reflect society's disagreement with the protestors'
message, but rather its disagreement with the existence of any
protests at the funeral ceremony. In other words, peaceful protest
statutes do not regulate protestors because of the ideas they express
but because of their acts of protest at a funeral. The action, rather
than the expression, constitutes the intolerable assault on the dignity
of mourners and the funeral services.3" 6 For the following reasons,
however, this distinction does not render a civility-based privacy
interest more palatable.
First, gauging whether officials regulate because protests are
inconsistent with a particular event or because they disagree with a
specific message is exceedingly difficult. The current controversy is
illustrative. Although some commentators argue that protests,
regardless of message, are inconsistent with funerals,387 it is equally
obvious that state legislators and courts responded to the hateful
messages of the Westboro Baptist Church.388 A civility-based privacy
interest allows officials to regulate for either reason and may mask
their attempts to punish an unpopular point of view.38 9 Thus, a
civility-based privacy interest may actually encourage officials to act
for illegitimate reasons.39 °
Second, fear of illegitimate motive aside, an argument that
protests are per se inconsistent with the dignity of funeral services
Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization
of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.").
386. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 254, at 263 (distinguishing between negative response
to "exposure to any ideas, regardless of the message conveyed" and negative response to
"ideas [people] find offensive or distasteful").
387. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 43, at 1472; Anna Zwierz Messar, Comment,
Balancing Freedom of Speech With the Right to Privacy: How to Legally Cope With
FuneralProtest Problem, 28 PACE L. REV. 101, 115-16 (2008).
388. In fact, commentators positing the per se incompatibility of protests and funerals
also fell into this trap, responding to the offensiveness of the Westboro Baptist Church
rather than analyzing whether protests generally interfere with the dignity of a funeral
ceremony. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 43, at 1471, 1473-76 (claiming that problems
associated with the protests arise not from their "extreme content" but from their
"disruptive nature," but then focusing primarily on audience's response to the church's
message); see also Steven R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U.
KAN. L. REV. 575, 608 (2007) (noting that the issue raised by the protests involves the
question of whether "deliberately hurtful messages," such as those propounded by Phelps,
deserve First Amendment protection).
389. See Vincent Blasi, The Teaching Function of the First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 387, 410-12 (1987) (reviewing LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986)
(discussing manifestations of officials' intolerance)).
390. Id. at 411-12 (discussing officials' intolerant actions in domains where they are
given great discretion).
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imposes a particular orthodoxy regarding funeral services.
Importantly, the argument that protests are inconsistent with funerals
does not focus on whether protests are physically or aurally
disruptive. Rather, it assumes that peaceful protests within certain
times and distances of funeral services conflict with these services
because of their singular character, mood and setting. By arguing for
broad restrictions in the name of protecting the "dignity or
reverential nature" of funeral services,391 the argument attempts to
carve out a space in which funerals are to be viewed in a specific
manner-i.e., with the utmost reverence and respect.
Certainly, as expressive ceremonies, funeral services are worthy
of protection. The Court's doctrine recognizes that government
regulators may restrict protests that are incompatible with activities in
certain places, such as schools and hospitals.392 That doctrine is
careful, however, to ensure that officials only carve out sufficient
space for the protected activities to operate without interference. It
does not allow officials to impose greater restrictions affecting our
attitudes. In contrast, excluding funeral protestors from hundreds of
feet around a ceremony because they should respect the dignity or
reverential nature of such ceremonies flies in the face of the Court's
refusal to allow government-imposed orthodoxy. In Board of
Education v. Barnette,"' for example, the Court found
unconstitutional a local school board's attempt to require students to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance. The Court wrote:
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural
diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of
occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes ....

If there is

any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.3 94
The Court has similarly rejected attempts to protect certain
symbols, such as the American flag, from use in what was considered

391. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6409(1) (2007); see also statutes cited supra notes 17377.
392. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (schools); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) (hospitals and medical clinics).
393. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
394. See id. at 641-42.
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to be offensive expressive activity.395
Johnson39 6 noted:

As the Court in Texas v.

There is ... no indication-either in the text of the Constitution
or in our cases interpreting it-that a separate juridical category
exists for the American flag alone. Indeed, we would not be
surprised to learn that the persons who framed our Constitution
and wrote the Amendment that we now construe were not
known for their reverence for the Union Jack. The First
Amendment does not guarantee that other concepts virtually
sacred to our Nation as a whole-such as the principle that
discrimination on the basis of race is odious and destructivewill go unquestioned in the marketplace of ideas. We decline,
therefore, to create for the flag an exception to the joust of
principles protected by the First Amendment.39
As with the flag and the Pledge of Allegiance, there is nothing
talismanic about funeral services suggesting that the government
should be able to preserve a particularly respectful vision of them.
Indeed, as a factual matter, an argument that funeral ceremonies
are necessarily solemn, reverential events to be preserved in a
particular fashion is simply untrue. Funeral ceremonies vary widely
across and within cultures.39 8 Many, even most, are quiet, dignified
events. However, funerals in the United States have also taken the
form of disruptive protests, for example when large groups mourn the
untimely death of a member at the hands of the police.399 A typical
New Orleans Jazz funeral involves both a somber journey to the

395. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417-18 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496

U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990).
396. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
397. Id. at 417-18 (citation omitted).
398. See generally ROBERT FULTON, DEATH AND IDENTITY (1965)

(discussing

sociological studies of death rituals in various cultures); David E. Stannard, Introduction,
in DEATH IN AMERICA vii, at vii (David E. Stannard ed. 1975) (noting class, cultural, and

geographic differences in funeral rituals).
399. See, e.g., JOYCE L. KORNBLUH, REBEL VOICES:

AN IWW ANTHOLOGY 200

(1964) (discussing 1913 funeral protest of two workers killed by private detectives);
Violent Protests Erupt After Funeral, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 2000, at A4

(concerning funeral protest for man shot by police involved 3,000 chanting mourners who

"clashed with police"); AIDS Activists Hold Protest Funeral, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
June 5, 1998, at 16A (discussing funeral of AIDS victim held in front of the White House
as a form of protest); Patrick Boyle & Brian Reilly, Snyder's Funeral Turns Into Protest,
WASH. TIMES, July 11, 1990, at Al (discussing how funeral of homelessness activist

became a "boisterous protest"); Baker, supra note 118, at 955 n.34 (discussing numerous
instances of funerals used as protests in the early twentieth century).
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gravesite and a more raucous, joyful return through the streets. 400
Furthermore, funeral rituals evolve over time as our culture
changes." 1 Actions that seem exceedingly odd now, such as giving

gifts of trinkets or alcohol to guests, were once reasonably
commonplace.4" 2 It is simply not possible to distill funeral ceremonies

into a rigid formula.
Cemeteries are similarly unique and changing places. Although
we currently think of cemeteries as places of repose, they did not
always command such respect. Prior to the nineteenth century,
"graveyards were treated simply as unattractive necessities to be
avoided as much as possible by the living.

'4 3

Many were unkempt

and often obliterated if needed for other uses.4 °4 In the nineteenth
century, however, the rural cemetery movement, with its emphasis on
nature and beauty, changed attitudes toward cemeteries. Cemeteries
built during that period were "so attractive that the majority of
visitors were not mourners but strollers and sightseers. For these
people the cemetery functioned as an outdoor museum and pleasure
ground.

'4 5

Modern cemeteries also have multiple social uses, such as

hosting concerts or fundraisers.4 °6 Some cemeteries have frequently
been "rallying points" for political protests, even prior to the actions
of the Westboro Baptist Church.4

7

400. See generally ELLIS L. MARSALIS, JR., Introduction,in REJOICE WHEN You DIE:

THE NEW ORLEANS JAZZ FUNERALS 1, 1-3 (La. State Univ. Press 1998) (describing the
manner in which a typical jazz funeral unfolds).
401. JOHN S. STEPHENSON, DEATH, GRIEF, AND MOURNING: INDIVIDUAL AND
SOCIAL REALITIES 203-14 (1985) (discussing evolution of funeral ceremonies in the eras
of sacred, secular and avoided death). Stephenson specifically cites studies showing, for
example, that Memorial Day services were "no longer as meaningful" in the 1960s and
1970s as they were during and immediately after World War II. Id. at 209 (discussing
study by Lloyd Warner). He attributes this phenomenon to our increasingly ambivalent
attitudes toward later wars and our tendency to avoid the subject of death. Id.
402. Id. at 204 (discussing practices at colonial funerals where "[f]unerals came to be
seen more and more as major social events, at which one paid one respects and remained
for the feasting and drinking that followed").
403. French, supra note 4, at 39.
404. Id.
405. Jules Zanger, Mount Auburn Cemetery: The Silent Suburb, 24 LANDSCAPE, no. 2
1980, 23-24; see also STEPHENSON, supra note 401, at 217 (noting that rural cemeteries
"became popular recreational sights"). The rural cemetery movement was designed to
"provide 'a suburban cemetery in which the beauties of nature should, as far as possible,
relieve from their repulsive features the tenements of the deceased.' " Id.
406. See Patricia Leigh Brown, In Need of Income Cemeteries Are Seeking Breathing
Clientele, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007, at Al (discussing fundraising efforts such as dinner
parties, lecture tours, and Sunday jazz concerts, held on cemetery grounds in an effort to
raise money for cemetery upkeep).
407. The Administrator of Arlington National Cemetery testified that:
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My point in the above discussion is not to highlight the ways in
which funeral ceremonies or activities within cemeteries are

particularly undignified. Rather, it is that our views of even the most
revered spaces and ceremonies vary across cultures and change over

time. Attempts to protect mourners' privacy at funeral ceremonies
must ensure that they have the space and freedom to mourn
uninterrupted while also preserving a diverse and fluid conception of
cemeteries and funeral services. 40 8 The argument that protests are per

se inconsistent with funeral services, however, assumes that there is
only one acceptable view of such activities and spaces. Accordingly,

it privileges a particular world view in a manner inconsistent with the
Court's jurisprudence.
doctrine:

As Robert Post has noted, the Court's

sketches a sphere of constitutional immunity that extends to
speech about public subjects, like "religious faith" or "political
belief" or "prominent" persons, even though such speech
violates the most elementary civility rules against
"exaggeration" or "vilification" or "excesses and abuses." The

Because of our urban location in the heart of our Nation's Capital, Arlington
National Cemetery frequently becomes a rallying point for groups wishing to
express their opposing views and opinions particularly regarding our Nation's
military policies. For this reason, certain conduct within the Cemetery grounds is
prohibited under Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section
553.22(f) .... Arlington National Cemetery imposes this prohibition, together
with other visitors' rules, to prevent disruptive behavior that could violate the
The
sanctity and dignity of our daily mission-to bury our military dead ....
regulatory prohibition mentioned earlier and visitors' rules for Arlington National
Cemetery have, in my opinion, adequately addressed potential demonstrations
and disruptive behavior in the past.
Legislative Hearing on H.R. 23, H.R. 601, H.R. 2188, H.R. 2963, H.R. 4843, H.R. 5037, and
H.R. 5038, Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the H.
Comm on Veteran's Affairs, 109th Cong. 96-98 (2006) (Statement of John C. Metzier,
Superintendent, Arlington National Cemetery). Two things are notable about this
statement. First, protests occurred at cemeteries well before the Westboro Baptist Church
began its activities, suggesting that it is not so much protests generally but this particular
group that most people find incompatible with funeral services. Second, federal officials
successfully managed protests by prohibiting them on cemetery grounds rather than
creating broad bubble zones, as most states have done.
408. Professor Njeri Rutledge argues for recognition of a "right to mourn" in the
context of funeral protest statutes. Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing
the Right of Free Speech Against the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV.
295, 315-29 (2008). To protect the rights of mourners, she argues that the Court should
expand its existing captive audience doctrine, because "[f]uneral picketing is at least as
intrusive if not more so than focused picketing of a residence .... " Id. at 329. As I argue
in the text, such an expansion is not necessary to protect funeral-goers' abilities to mourn
as they wish.
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justification for this immunity is that America contains "many"
diverse communities which are often in sharp conflict. If the
state were to enforce the civility rules of one community, say
those of Catholics, as against those of another, say Jehovah's
Witnesses, the state would in effect be using its power and
authority to support some communities and repress others. But
the first amendment forbids the state from doing this, in order
that "many types of life, character, opinion
and belief can
40 9
develop unmolested and unobstructed.
Although most of us desperately want the Westboro Baptist
Church or other protestors to treat funeral goers with greater respect,
as long as their speech is part of public discourse,4 0 free speech
principles allow regulators to do only so much to require an outward
showing of civility.
C. Revisiting Privacy, Captivity, and FuneralProtests

None of the above discussion diminishes the validity of
mourners' privacy interests. We must define the privacy interest with
care, however, to comply with the Court's established doctrine.
Although the Court's cases are somewhat unclear, over time they
have established certain foundational principles regarding the privacy
interest in free speech law. Specifically, these principles establish
three spheres of privacy in which individuals' interest in being left
alone decreases as they are increasingly in public.
First, privacy interests are at their apex in the home which is "the
last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick." '' To protect
occupants' privacy, the state may regulate physically and aurally
invasive speech.4" It may also restrict speech that psychically invades
409. Post, supra note 196, at 629-30 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
310 (1940)); see also Post, supra note 22, at 2093 ("Although much of our social life occurs
within such a social structure, we also inhabit many kinds of social structures that are quite
different.").
410. Church members believe that their speech contributes to public debate because
they attempt to spread a particular message regarding gay activity and the country's
military agenda. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Absent additional factors
making their expression low-value, such as fighting words or incitement, their speech falls
well within the Court's definition of speech contributing to public discourse. See supra
note 70-72 and accompanying text. Importantly, peaceful funeral protest statutes do not
require speech to be low-value before regulating it, nor are they limited to the Phelps
family, whose protests many people regard as especially hateful. Rather, they regulate all
protests, including the political protests referred to at Arlington National Cemetery, supra
note 407, which further supports the notion that the statutes aim at high-value speech.
411. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
412. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949).
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the home, for example through targeted protests.41 3 Although such
protests may be peaceful, they are analogous to harassment because
the very presence of protestors targeting one's residence makes " 'the
home ... something less than a home.' "414 Finally, the state may
regulate indecent expression that arrives through particularly invasive
media because of the particularly sordid aspects of profanity and
nudity.415 Again, the exceptional nature of the home as a refuge
allows the government to regulate particularly offensive speech in a
place where we should not be required to avert our eyes.
Second, the privacy interest is decidedly narrower as the
audience moves from the home to other spatially-bounded places.
The Court has recognized that individuals in buildings, e.g., medical
clinics or schools, have a privacy interest in being free from noisy or
physically disruptive protests. 416 Thus, the privacy interest ensures
that audience members have sufficient space to engage in their
intended activities without interference from physically or aurally
invasive speech. Speech that merely offends the audience with its
content, however, is not sufficiently invasive to warrant either a
finding of audience captivity or an invasion of privacy.417 The Court
has rightfully limited the state's ability to regulate offensive content
to the home, 418 and even then such regulation relates primarily to
419
indecency.

413. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486-88 (1988).
414. Id. at 486 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
415. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978). The potential presence
of children also affected the Pacifica Court's decision. Id. at 749.
416. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 380 (1997) (upholding

fixed buffer zones outside of abortion clinics); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512
U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (upholding a thirty-six-foot buffer zone and limited noise restrictions
outside a clinic that performed abortions); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
120-21 (1972) (upholding a noise prevention ordinance prohibiting individuals from being
purposefully disruptive on grounds adjacent to a school building while school was in

session).
417. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773.
418. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-19, at 950

n.24 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]he concept of a 'captive audience' is dangerously encompassing,

and the Court has properly been reluctant to accept its implications whenever a regulation
is not content-neutral.").
419. For example, an attempt to regulate targeted protests based on their content (i.e.,
anti-abortion picketing) would surely be struck down despite the recognized privacy
interest in the home. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (striking down
law restricting all picketing around dwellings except labor picketing although it recognized
that "the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to
escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value"). A court
would likely presume that such a law attempts to regulate not because one cannot avert
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Third, a carefully circumscribed privacy interest exists in the
public forum. The Court has unequivocally stated that audience
members do not have a broad right to be free of unwanted speech in
public spaces like streets, parks, and sidewalks.42 ° The Court also
seems willing, however, to recognize a privacy interest in being free
from deliberately noisy or physical disruptions if audience members
attend a specific event in public, such as a concert or other
ceremony. 421' Furthermore, individuals within carefully defined public
areas have a privacy interest in freedom from expression that is
analogous to harassment, such as "persistent 'importunity, following
and dogging' " or close approaches within a confined area.422 Such
expression does not invade privacy because it offends us. Rather, it
invades our privacy because it invades our personal space and
involves intimidation, fear and possibly significant physical
complications.4 23
As this summary demonstrates, the Court has recognized an
intrusion-based privacy interest in its free speech cases. Two factors
are important to the Court's recognition of that privacy interest: (1)
whether the expression involved is invasive, rather than merely
offensive; and (2) whether that speech invades an area of seclusion in
a manner leaving audience members unable to avoid it (i.e., making
them captive).424 Both factors are critical to the Court's finding of an
intrusion-based privacy interest. Even in the home, where the privacy
interest is at its apex, the Court has not discarded the requirement of
an invasion. Rather, it finds otherwise protected speech as invasive
because of the nature of the home as our most important sanctuary
from daily life.
Statutes regulating peaceful funeral protests and related court
decisions focus only on whether the audience was present at a
particular event without also requiring that speech be invasive in the
one's eyes, but because the state disagrees with the protestors' message. The latter does
not fit within any stated notion of the privacy interest.
420. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000); Schenck, 519 U.S. at 358.
421. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716; Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
422. Hill, 530 U.S. at 718.
423. Id. at 718 n.25 ("The purpose of the Colorado statute is not to protect a potential
listener from hearing a particular message. It is to protect those who seek medical
treatment from the potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an unwelcome
individual delivers a message (whatever its content) by physically approaching an
individual at close range, i.e., within eight feet.").
424. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), is the sole Court decision
to truly depart from this formula, as it seems to have focused primarily on the audience's
captivity within a particular space without requiring that speech be invasive in the sense
that the Court's precedents have established. See supra note 255 for discussion.
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sense described above. Attempting to analogize to the home, they
justify restricting protests due to the special nature of funeral
ceremonies. While such ceremonies are unquestionably an important
and unique ritual,425 they do not warrant finding that all unwanted
speech is invasive. As noted above, even in the home the Court's
jurisprudence does not ignore the requirement of invasiveness.
Assuming it did, however, disposing of the invasiveness requirement
simply because one attends a certain function is a mistake. Focusing
solely on audience presence in a particular space makes little sense.
One is never really captive to space; one always has the choice,
whether reasonable or not, to leave.42 6 The Court's focus on captivity
in a particular space makes sense only when coupled with an inquiry
into whether speech is so invasive and beyond the audience's control
that it is unavoidable.
Extending the Frisby rationale to funeral services because they
are particularly unique and deserving of broader privacy protection is
also a mistake. One can make that claim about a host of events,
ranging from graduation ceremonies to weddings and bar mitzvahs.
Although funeral services command enormous sympathy as a ritual,
nothing prevents the argument that other momentous occurrences
should be free of expression that offends. Who among us wants
47
political protests to sully the intense joy of a wedding?
Accordingly, the Court must maintain the requirement that speech be
invasive if the captive audience doctrine is to have any limits at all.
What then can states do to protect mourners' privacy at funerals?
More than many people realize given the seemingly all or nothing
manner in which this debate has been framed. The state can exclude
protestors from the immediate area in which a ceremony takes place.
Thus, if a funeral service occurs within a public or private building,
protestors have no free speech right to attend it. Protestors also may
be excluded from outdoor ceremonies, especially those taking place
in cemeteries. 42' The Court's doctrine makes clear that individuals
have a right to gather for expressive purposes and to exclude

425. Rutledge, supra note 408, at 319-20.

426. Strauss, supra note 134, at 89.
427. Anti-gay protestors have demonstrated outside of the recent weddings of same sex
couples in California. See, e.g., Bobby Caina Calvan, Religious Foes Call Weddings
Immoral, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 18, 2008, at A22.

428. Such space is not considered to be a forum to which speakers are entitled access.
See supra notes 60, 162-63 and accompanying text discussing Court doctrine pertaining to
speakers on private property and government property amounting to non-public fora.
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others.429 That, coupled with the recognized right to be free of noise
or other physical disturbances, argues in favor of excluding protestors
from the immediate area in which ceremonies occur.
Laws restricting intentionally noisy or disruptive protests are also
unproblematic assuming they are appropriately tailored.43 Although
such laws reach speech that occurs in a traditional public forum,
prevention of actual disruption is a legitimate interest.43'
Furthermore, "[i]t is difficult to imagine a deeper intrusion into
private life ... than a demonstration that intentionally interferes with
' 432

the ability of family members to mourn a loved one in peace."
Similarly, laws preventing harassing protests or protests that impede
access to the funeral fall within the recognized privacy interests in
Madsen, Schenck, and Hill.
Laws that restrict peaceful protests for hundreds of feet around
funeral ceremonies, however, cannot legitimately claim to do so in the
name of protecting privacy. All such protests do not invade the
funeral ceremony, since, by definition, they are peaceful,
nondisruptive, and do not involve harassment. Even if one argues
that the presence of protestors distracts mourners (regardless of
message), such an argument supports removing protestors only from
the area immediately adjacent to the ceremony and not from the
overall location. 3 In other words, a small buffer zone is appropriate
to preserve the mourners' ability to carry on a ceremony without
disruption. Large buffer zones, however, protect mourners not only
during the ceremony but as they enter buildings or cemeteries as well.
Such persons are not captive to intrusive speech. They can proceed
by peaceful protestors while averting their eyes. Admittedly,
429. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 641 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-America
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 580-81 (1995).
430. Discussion of the tailoring issue under intermediate scrutiny is beyond the scope
of this Article. Other commentators have surveyed the validity of funeral statutes in light
of the Court's intermediate scrutiny standard. See, e.g., McAllister, supranote 388, at 595602 (generally discussing whether statutes survive intermediate scrutiny); Andrea

Cornwell, Comment, A FinalSalute to Lost Soldiers: Preservingthe Freedom of Speech at
Military Funerals,56 AM. U. L. REV. 1329, 1346-71 (2007) (discussing whether federal law

would survive intermediate scrutiny); Megan Dunn, Note, The Right to Rest In Peace:
Missouri Prohibits Protestingat Funerals, 71 MO. L. REV. 1117, 1131-38 (2007) (discussing

application of intermediate scrutiny to Missouri's law).
431. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,115-21 (1972).
432. HEYMAN, supra note 191, at 154-55.

433. I distinguish such regulations from existing statutes regulating peaceful protests.
The purpose of a small buffer zone protecting the area immediately adjacent to the
ceremony is to preserve funeral-goers' ability to mourn as they see fit. The current
statutes, by using large buffer zones to protect against civility transgressions, regulate
protestors in order to enforce a particular attitude toward funerals.
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mourners may initially see or hear such speech, but the Court does
not recognize a right never to see or hear unwanted speech in public.
Rather, it recognizes a right to be free from constant, unavoidable
exposure.434
Similar problems arise with attempts to protect
mourners during funeral processions. Unless protestors attempt to
participate in, interrupt, or otherwise harass a procession, it is difficult
to argue that individuals in funeral processions are "captive" to
speech along the roadside although they may find the expression
unpleasant.
CONCLUSION

"Great cases like hard cases," Justice Holmes once said, "make
'
bad law."435
Such cases "are called great.., because of some accident
of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of
hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will
'
bend."436
Some of the Court's cases involving the clash of privacy
interests and free speech were great.
Most of them were
unquestionably hard. Whether they made bad law is less clear.437 We
do know that the doctrine resulting from the Court's decisions is
distinctly lacking in clarity.
Litigation over the legitimacy of funeral protests, however, has
the potential to make very bad law. The combination of an illdefined interest, unclear doctrine, and controversial protests has
"exercise[d] a kind of hydraulic pressure" that threatens to engulf our
understanding of this issue. It has caused state officials and courts to
respond out of emotion rather than with careful analysis of the
Court's precedents. The resulting law, if it remains, will have a lasting
and detrimental impact on our free speech jurisprudence.

434. See, e.g., MELVILLE B. NIMMER, ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1-33 (1984)
("[I]nvoluntary but merely momentary contact with the speech of others enough to invoke
a captive audience basis for suppressing the unwelcome speech would largely undermine
the entire freedom of speech fabric.").
435. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
436. Id.
437. Commentators have argued that specific decisions are wrong, poorly reasoned,
and often the result of political pressure regarding unpopular speakers. Justice Scalia, for
example, has argued that the Court's upholding restrictions of anti-abortion speech was
motivated by politics. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

